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LET'S RAISE MILITARY-SCIENTIFIC WORK TO THE LEVEL OF PARTY DEMANDS
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On 29 March the 23rd Congress of the CPSU will open. That congress will determine the tasks of the next stage of communist construction, will approve the assignments of the new five-year plan, and will set forth the further paths for the development of science and technology in the Soviet Union. Thus, all aspects of the life and activity of the Soviet state and people will obtain an inspiring stimulus, contributing even more to the well-directed and effective construction of communism in our country.

During recent years the Soviet Union has moved far ahead in all areas of communist construction: the assignments of the seven-year plan in the area of industry have been fulfilled; the over-all volume of industrial production increased during the 7 years by 84%, as against the 80% according to plan. The foundations were laid for the further improvement of agriculture. There was a noticeable rise in the national standard of living.

The complete progress of our society is closely linked with the development of science. Soviet scientists have successfully solved the task of the creation of an atomic industry and made great achievements in the research and mastery of outer space. Other branches of the natural sciences which received broad development are mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology, which play the decisive role in technical progress. On the basis of these sciences, major successes were achieved in rocket construction, aircraft construction, the production of electric power and new materials, in the development of radio electronics, semiconductor technology, and in many other branches of industrial production. Soviet geologists have overthrown all the old ideas of the natural resources of our country: they have discovered entire underground seas of petroleum, new deposits of the most varied ores, and tremendous reserves of natural gas.

The social sciences, which develop the philosophical, political, and economic substantiation of the construction of communism in our country, are at a higher level.

The successes in all branches of the national economy and Soviet science have a beneficial influence upon the the reinforcement of the Soviet Union's defense capability and the development of her armed forces. Our country is continuing the further improvement of all

branches of the armed forces and combat arms, military technology, weapons, and rocket technology, including strategic rockets. All branches of the armed forces have been equipped with nuclear weapons of various capacities. Major successes have been achieved in the improvement of ordinary weapons, control and communications facilities, and in the improvement of ordinary weapons, control and communications facilities, and in the creation of new models of armament for all branches of the armed forces and combat arms. The ground forces, PVO of the country forces, air forces, and the navy have become qualitatively different. There has been a change in their ratio and role in armed combat. Technical progress has brought about fundamental changes in the means of armed combat. The development of armament and military technology is making new demands upon Soviet military science, which has moved far ahead in the elaboration of new methods and forms of conducting military operations and warfare in general, in the improvement of the organizational structure of the troops, the system of control, in guaranteeing high, constant combat readiness of the army and navy, and in training and educating the personnel.

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During recent years military regulations and manuals have been prepared and published, to conform to the demands of conducting combat actions and operations in modern warfare. In the published works and on the pages of magazines, the authors have studied the nature of modern warfare, the role and importance of its initial period, the basic problems of strategy, operational art, and tactics, both under conditions of the use of nuclear weapons and when conducting military actions with ordinary weapons. With sufficient completeness the authors have publicized the experience of troop exercises and command-and-staff exercises, and studied the problems of the combat utilization of the branches of the armed forces, the combat arms, and the rear area of the Soviet Army and Navy, as well as the activity of commanders, political agencies, and party organizations in the training, instructing, and educating of Soviet military cadres.

There has been an enlivening of research work in the natural sciences. A number of monographs, pamphlets, and teaching aids have been published, which are broadly used by the officer personnel. Military-theoretical works have been given a favorable evaluation in the army, navy, and military-educational establishments: these works include Marksizm-Leninizm o Voynе i Armii /Marxism-Leninism Concerning Warfare and the Army/, in which, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology, the essence of warfare and the nature and types of wars in the present-day era are revealed, the natural laws determining the progress and outcome of combat actions are analyzed, and the basic principles of the construction of the Soviet Armed Forces are indicated. A course of lectures on scientific communism has been prepared and published in a mass-scale printing. The topics of scientific research in the field of the social sciences as applicable to the needs of the armed forces have

...come up to the minute, and are linked with the life and tasks of the troops.

Considerable success has been achieved in military history. The historians devoted special attention to research on the military experience of the Second World War, particularly the Great Patriotic War. The numerous works on military history which were created during recent years are contributing to the development of military theory, the expansion of the field of vision of generals and officers, and the education of the personnel in the spirit of the revolutionary traditions of the Soviet people and the combat traditions of our army and navy. These works give a profound analysis of the development of strategy during the Great Patriotic War, the use of large formations [ob'yedineniya] and formations [soyedineniya] of branches of the armed forces, and combat arms, and the work of the rear of the Soviet Army. Bourgeois falsifiers of history were unmasked and subjected to scientific criticism.

At the same time the state of military-scientific work does not yet meet the demands of the party or the needs of the armed forces. To a certain degree this reflects the shortcomings and omissions in the social sciences in recent years. A number of works contained elements of subjectivism and of voluntarism, and this retarded the development of theory. In individual works, the authors threw light in a one-sided manner upon certain important stages in the history of the CPSU and of socialist society.

In the field of military science, especially military art, the authors give few, and insufficiently concrete, recommendations concerning problems of present-day armed combat, methods and forms of conducting it, of reducing the time required to put troops into complete combat readiness, the carrying out of military actions under conditions of use of radio interference, etc. This is explained, in particular, by the fact that many military-scientific works are executed only on the basis of already well-known literary sources and materials in the archives, rather than being the result of the careful and profound study of the concrete experience of the troop and command-and-staff exercises, the combat and political training of the troops, their entire life and activity at the present-day stage of military construction. The authors make little application of present-day methods of studying military and social problems with the use of the latest scientific data provided by mathematics and computer technology. A certain number of the scientific research projects are still not always linked with vital military problems. The old tendency of escaping into the past, to the detriment of the present-day tasks, has not been stamped out. Our officer's library still has a small number of completely valuable works on the elaboration of the Leninist principles of military construction and of troop management. The experience of operational-tactical exercises and maneuvers with the use of new types of weapons and combat technology is not being studied in the proper volume.

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insufficient development of theoretical work in the field of scientific research on the wartime economy, or the elaboration of problems of the economic, scientific, and military potentials. Commanders and political workers from the troops, who are capable of giving valuable knowledge to publicize the experience of combat and political training of units /chasti/ and elements /podrazdeleniya/, are not being drawn sufficiently into military-scientific work.

In the military scientific-research institutes the basic principles of military science and Marxist dialectics do not always find the proper practical application. In certain works the authors take little consideration of the influence of economic factors upon the development of armament, make incomplete utilization of the latest achievements of science, especially in such areas as applied mathematics, cybernetics, computer technology, control theory, and the scientific principles of the making of decisions. The opportunities revealed by achievements in the field of radio electronics, the theory of operations research, etc., are incompletely utilized.

As confirmed by the results of checks made on the state of military-scientific work, the basic causes of the shortcomings which have been noted are, primarily, poor checking to assure the fulfillment of the plans for scientific research, on the part of certain scientific councils, directors of scientific-research military institutions, academies, and schools; the lack of concrete assistance to scientists in the preparation and implementation of their projects; and insufficient concern for the creation of the necessary conditions for their fruitful creative activity. Certain directors of scientific-research institutions and divisions, and chiefs of departments do not set a worthy personal example in scientific work, failing, for years at a time, to produce any significant scientific-research works. The party organizations of a number of scientific-research institutions and military educational institutions do not always penetrate deeply into the status of military-scientific work and do not always assure the leading role of Communist Party members in science.

The appropriate agencies and organizations which have been called upon to analyze and direct the work done by the military-scientific cadres, to give commendations to and to promote officers who have distinguished themselves in scientific work do not engage in this work on a systematic basis.

The most desirable forms of centralized management and coordination of military-scientific work have not yet been found. As a result, one observes unnecessary duplication and the dissipation of the efforts of military scientists in a large number of small-scale topics, and the technical support of the research projects is not at the modern level. The tie between scientific subject matter and the needs of practice is still weak, as is the efficacy of the scientific works.

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By the efforts of the Communist Party, its Central Committee, especially after the decision of the October (1964) Plenary Session of the Central Committee, all the conditions have been created for the further creative improvement of the theoretical base of Soviet military construction in the interests of reinforcing the country's defense. Military science is constantly developing, is providing the theoretical substantiation for very important principles which form the basis of the construction of the armed forces and their preparation for the conducting of armed combat under the present-day conditions of the headlong development of science and technology. It is required of military-scientific cadres, generals, and officers engaged in everyday practice that they have a clear-cut idea of the tendencies of scientific-technical progress and that they carry out thorough research of its influence upon the forms and methods of armed combat; that they assure the timely elaboration of scientifically substantiated recommendations for the creation of new and the improvement of existing models of armament and combat technology, the organization of troops, and their most effective application during the conducting of a war, operation, or combat.

To achieve that over-all task, the basic efforts of military-scientific cadres must be directed to the further elaboration of the very important problems of modern warfare and the methods of conducting it with all branches of the armed forces, to the search for methods to improve the combat readiness of the troops and the methods of disrupting sudden nuclear attack by the enemy, to the guaranteeing of constant supremacy over a probable enemy in the complete mastery by all the personnel of the combat equipment which is standard equipment.

Military-scientific minds must provide substantial assistance to generals and officers in the elaboration of the most desirable method of troop control with the utilization of the technical achievements in the field of the mechanization and automation of labor-consuming and complex processes involved in the work done by commanders and staffs.

The mastery, by officers and generals, of computer technology contributes to the increasing of their efficiency of troop management, to the objectivity of the decisions made, and to the precision of control of modern combat technology. Hence an important task of generals and officers is the most rapid, most profound study of computer technology and the search for ways and means of making the most desirable utilization of that technology. The elaboration of methods of preparing data for the carrying out of the necessary computations with the aid of computer technology helps military cadres to master that technology more rapidly.

At the present time the army and navy have first-class combat technology and weapons as standard equipment. But one must not rest on one's laurels. The progress of science and technology, especially under

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of the socialist system of economy, is a very important factor in the mighty growth of the productive forces of society, and creates the conditions for increasing the country's defense capability, for accelerating the development of the armed forces, and the further improvement of armaments as a whole. But one must not forget that science and technology are also developing abroad, causing a rapid improvement of armament in the armies of the capitalist countries, and this is leading to a substantial change in the conditions and methods of armed combat.

To maintain the military supremacy of the Soviet Armed Forces at the necessary level it is also necessary to do a large amount of work in other fields of military construction. At the present time it is difficult to imagine the changes that the armed forces will undergo in the remote future, or the combat and tactical-technical data that the new equipment will possess. But the currently existing achievements in the development of science are providing scientists with the opportunity to look into the future and to take them into consideration when creating new weapons and combat technology, as well as when elaborating problems of military art and troop organization. A factor of exceptionally great importance is scientific forecasting, based on the analysis of the tendencies of the development of military technology and the methods of armed combat. For such an analysis it is necessary to make the broad application of methods of modeling and the use of statistics. A logical, mathematical, or physical model reflecting the essential links between phenomena and processes, as established by observations or previous analysis, makes it possible to ascertain new, previously unknown natural laws governing their development. The use of models, in combination with war games, maneuvers, and troop exercises, must become one of the most important methods of conducting research in military science.

Great prospects for development are opening up in all fields of military technology. On the basis of new discoveries in the field of fuels, materials, radio electronics, precision mechanics, and precision optics, there has been an unprecedentedly rapid progress in rocket technology. The Soviet Union has had major successes in the creation of means of antirocket defense. Many efforts in that field are also being undertaken abroad. In the capitalist countries, a large amount of attention is being devoted to the development of aviation, both in the direction of the creation of aircraft with high tactical-flight characteristics and in the direction of the creation of VTOL /vertical take-off and landing/ craft, as well as flying apparatuses intended to provide for a sharp increase in troop mobility.

Many foreign specialists consider it completely possible that in the near future there will appear elements, units, and formations which are lighter, more mobile, and capable of moving freely over rivers,

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mounting areas in which there have been fires and obstructions, areas with a high radiation level, and other natural and artificial obstacles, and capable of destroying, seizing, or defending important objectives.

The further development of weapons and combat technology will inevitably lead to major changes in the organizational structure of the troops. The new means of armed combat will cause the improvement of the ways and means of the organization and conducting of an operation or combat. The scientific-research work of military scientists in the field of military art, in all its links, must be closely tied in with the work being done by the scientists at scientific-research institutes and design bureaus which are creating new models of military technology, so that, simultaneously with their appearance among the troops, there will be provided, in plenty of time, well-elaborated recommendations for their application, and so that proposals can be given concerning the corresponding changes in the methods and means of conducting combat actions.

Large and important tasks are confronting the military historians. The military history of the Soviet Union is a mighty means of the military-patriotic education of Soviet citizens. The peoples of the multinational Soviet Union have a proud military history. Over a period of many centuries they astonished the world by their military art and heroism in combatting aggressors and repeatedly saved the European and other peoples, their national independence and culture, from the barbarism of conquerors. The Soviet Union helped many countries to acquire their national independence.

Military history is becoming, to an ever-increasing extent, the sphere of the ideological struggle against imperialism. The bookstores of foreign countries are filled with a large amount of bourgeois military-historical literature, in which military events are described tentatively, are deliberately falsified, and are broadly used by our opponents for anticommunist purposes. The time has long been ripe for the creation of major Marxist-Leninist military-historical works written in clear, figurative language, and intended for the mass reader not only in the USSR, but also abroad. It is an act of honor for Soviet military historians to create those works which would provide the communist and workers' parties, and the advanced intelligentsia, with weapons for combatting the bourgeois ideology, particularly for combatting the falsifiers of military history. The Marxist-Leninist elaboration of many works on military history has already begun, as well as works on the history of the wars of the Soviet people to protect the socialist Motherland, the publication of which is being awaited for the fiftieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

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The Soviet Armed Forces have at their disposal a large detachment of workers in the social sciences. Their purpose is to develop and to make more concrete the Marxist-Leninist theory of society, to reveal the objective laws of socialism and communism and the mechanism governing their operation, to promptly reveal any problems or tasks which are coming to a culminating point, and to indicate substantiated paths for their solution. A large amount of importance is attached to the improvement of the methods and style of scientific management of all aspects of the country's life, an improvement based on a thorough scientific analysis and complete consideration of the objective laws governing social development. The country is carrying out a tremendous amount of work to introduce scientific methods of controlling industry and of improving planning, and this has a direct relation to the activity of the armed forces and their scientific institutions. Questions of control demand the most serious attitude on the part not only of the practical organizers, but also of the scientists. The scientific principles of control deserve much greater attention than they have been shown until the present time. In this light, a special place is occupied by the development of methods of making decisions, methods based on the utilization of objective factors. A division of military science which must become important is that division concerned with the theoretical principles of the planning of all fields of the activity of the armed forces, which take into consideration primarily and chiefly the material, objective factors, rather than the points of view of individual persons.

In the sciences encompassing problems of control there is occurring, to an ever-increasing degree, the alliance of the humanities and the exact sciences, and there is occurring a process of the mathematization of those areas which, in the recent past, were considered to be purely logical. This makes it possible to introduce into the analysis of many social problems not only qualitative, but also quantitative concepts and values, and this contributes to the increasing of the objectivity and precision of the research projects.

The Soviet Armed Forces have at their disposal a large detachment of workers in the social sciences. The majority of them are concentrated in military educational institutions. Their most important task consists in continuing the study and scientific generalization of the practice of Soviet military construction and new natural laws governing the development of the armed forces, as well as the work experience of commanders, political agencies, the entire officer complement, and party and Komsomol organizations in the training and communist education of the fighting men.

The force of Soviet science lies in the objectivity of the analysis of social processes, in the clear-cut nature of class positions, and in Communist Party-mindedness. The Communist Party-mindedness of the scientist lies in his approach to any job from the point of view of the

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Interests of the party, the state, and the people in the irreconcilable struggle against those who deviate from the party line, in the subordination of his personal interests to social interests, in the acute political evaluation of facts and events, and in the fight against political indifference, a know-it-all attitude, and complacency. The more consistently the principles of party-mindedness are carried out in scientific research, the more accurate and profound the scientific conclusions will be and the more effective their social influence.

The successful solution of very important problems of the theory of military art, the study, generalization, and dissemination of the desirable experience of operational and combat training would be unthinkable without well-organized military-scientific work.

Military-scientific work in the Soviet Army is not only the purview of the scientific theoreticians. It has become the vocation and duty of a large number of officers and generals engaged in practice. This is aided primarily by the universal growth of our command cadres, their military and military-engineering education. Officers and generals working among the troops have unlimited opportunities to study problems of the improvement of the organizational structure of all troop and army organizations, their equipment, combat utilization, forms and methods of conducting combat actions, etc. Among the troops it is possible, on a practical basis, to check the correctness of new principles proposed by theory. For these purposes it is necessary to bring military scientific work as close as possible to the troops and to include in that work generals and officers of all assignment categories. The striving for the constant development of military science is an important characteristic and a necessary condition for the viability of an army, its continuous development, and the improvement and strengthening of combat readiness and combat capability. It is necessary to achieve the highest effectiveness of the well-substantiated scientific principles and recommendations, their careful practical checking, and their rapid and complete implementation.

The methods, style, and entire atmosphere of scientific work need serious improvement. Military science will be doomed to stagnation if scientific collectives lack a creative atmosphere, if there are any manifestations of a monopoly on the part of individual persons of cliquism, or subjectivism. Scientific minds develop more fruitfully in proportion to the extent to which there are creative discussions among scientists, and there is widespread criticism and self-criticism. Much depends upon the ability of a scientist to concede to the remarks of his comrades and to reject conclusions if they have proved to be incorrect. The correct opinion on particular problems will be crystallized when the scientific problem is discussed on a fundamental basis in a conflict of opinions, when, for that purpose, the collectives drawn into the discussion consist not only of homogeneous collectives working

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In allied fields, but also of specialists from other branches of science.

Science will benefit from the increase of demandingness upon the scientific councils accepting the defense of doctoral and candidates' dissertations. It cannot be deemed normal when the reports submitted by certain official and unofficial opponents consist entirely in the simple paraphrasing of the content of the dissertation and a superficial critique of specific shortcomings. Effective aid to the person submitting the dissertation is the objective, fundamental, completely unbiased critique of the dissertation, the revealing of its pluses and minuses, and a detailed consideration of those scientific conclusions and generalizations or practical recommendations which are contained in the dissertation. Science can only profit from having the person submitting the dissertation correctly evaluate the critical comments and raise the scientific level of his work. It is especially important, in plenty of time, to analyze the subject matter of the dissertations, bringing them closer to the needs of practice. It is well known that many dissertations which have been defended do not find their reflection in military construction and are not even being published.

The role of collective scientific works has increased as never before. The Soviet Armed Forces have traveled along a path of development which has lasted almost half a century. The Communist Party created them without having any previous experience and, in creating them, overcame tremendous difficulties and obstacles. Our army and navy represent a monolithic organism. New, deep-seated processes are taking part in that organism and new natural laws are manifesting their effect. The revolution in military affairs has posed a number of new problems for Soviet military construction, for military strategy, operational art, and tactics. At the present time even a very experienced scientific worker is not always capable, alone, of elaborating a complex problem touching upon various aspects of the theory and practice of military affairs. But what is impossible for one scientist can be accomplished by collectives of scientists. Life itself and practice indicate that scientific works prepared by co-author collectives are distinguished by greater creative depth and practical significance, since collective creation, the comparing of various points of views and proposals always leads to a more profound and more correct elaboration of problems. It is necessary to make it a broader practice to create co-author collectives consisting of representatives of the scientific-research institutions and higher military educational institutions. This, of course, does not preclude the elaboration of independent topics and works by individual authors. But what is required of them is a profound and universal knowledge of the selected topic and well thought-out, well substantiated evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations.

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Serious scientific research projects require varied, reliable, and scientifically processed information concerning the internal state of the object of research and concerning those external conditions, ties, and influences in which they function. Thus, when studying military-social problems it is necessary to have a good knowledge of the over-all principles and conditions of military construction, the life of the troops, the degree of their combat readiness, the level of their military discipline, and other factors. In addition, special attention should be devoted to such types of combat training as field training standards, and technical and special training. Good organization of informational work and statistics, the exchange of experience gained from scientific research, and the correct utilization of that experience with a consideration of the specific conditions and tasks of the research collectives are of exceptionally great importance for guaranteeing objective scientific conclusions.

Of no less importance are research projects in the field of the morale factor, which exerts a tremendous influence upon the combat readiness of the armed forces and the outcome of the armed struggle. In the area of the psychological training of the personnel, the researchers must attentively study a large number of soldiers, sergeants, and officers, their on-the-job and political-morale qualities, character, abilities and tendencies, ideals and interests, memory and attention, volitional qualities, temperament, state of health, attitude to military service, successes and shortcomings in work, etc.

The life and activity of the fighting men take place in military collectives. They are linked to one another by the commonality of purposes, views, standards, and rules of conduct. Therefore, in addition to a knowledge of each fighting man, it is necessary to have a good knowledge of the military collectives. Each military collective represents a complex organism according to its structure. In it, in addition to differences between people according to age, education, nationality, family status, character, and many other factors, there exist extremely varied types of interrelations among its members. These interrelations must be based upon mutual respect and demandingness, mutual understanding and true, mutual help, concern, support, and assistance.

Without complete information it is difficult to count on scientifically substantiated, original works devoted to the training and educating of the personnel. The researcher draws knowledge about the troops from the most varied sources: personal observation, participation at inspections, presence at party and Komsomol meetings, individual and group discussions, personal participation in mass-political, and cultural-educational work, and many other forms of training and education. In all instances, regular trips taken by the researcher to the troop units, his personal communication with the fighting men, represent an indispensable condition for fruitful military-scientific work.

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Concrete sociological research works have begun to become a firm part of the arsenal of our science. The objects of that research are not only various aspects of armed combat, but also the important area of such military-social problems as the formation of the communist philosophy of the fighting men; the education in them of high political and combat-morale qualities, and primarily, a disciplined attitude; the conversion of political knowledge into profound personal convictions; the formation of a well-running, easily controlled military collective; problems of party and Komsomol work, and military education and psychology. Soviet military sciences, as well as commanders and political workers, have already accumulated and are improving various methods of concrete sociological research works.

Our military educational institutions have great opportunities for the complete improvement of the quality of military-scientific research. The raising of the level of that work is inseparably linked with the day-by-day concern shown by the directors of scientific-research institutions, and military-educational institutions for the creation and improvement of the material-and-technical base, concerning the providing of scientific-research institutes, scientific laboratories and groups, and departments with modern high-grade apparatus, the latest instruments, and domestic and foreign literature.

All our military scientists must constantly and unswervingly strive to see that their activity is directed to the introduction of science into practice, and to the raising of the might of our armed forces, their constant combat readiness, and their supremacy above probable enemies.

Communism and science are organically linked. V. I. Lenin's statement that, without science, it is impossible to construct a modern army has an especially loud ring today. Soviet military scientists see their task in assuring that all their efforts, knowledge, and energy are directed to the noble cause of the strengthening of the defense capability of the Soviet Union and its armed forces.

THE MOST IMPORTANT LENINIST PRINCIPLES OF MANAGEMENT
AND METHODS OF WORKING WITH MILITARY CADRES

Maj - Gen V. Domnikov

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The Communist Party teaches that desirable results in any practical activity depend, to a considerable extent, upon the ability of our cadres to work in accordance with party interests, rejecting everything that is obsolete or out-of-date and relying on Leninist principles of management, the ability to develop forms and methods of working with cadres which have been tested by life and to propose new forms and methods. Testimony of this is provided by the decisions of the October and November (1964) and March and September (1965) Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The revolutionary reforms which have occurred during recent years in military affairs led to a sharp increase in the demands made upon Soviet military cadres. The officer complement of the Soviet Armed Forces has been confronted with new tasks involved in the theoretical elaboration and practical utilization of new methods and forms of conducting military actions, of organizing troops, and training and educating the personnel. The carrying out of these tasks at the present-day stage of the construction of the armed forces depends, to a decisive extent, upon the ability of our military cadres to organize service activity correctly, and upon their ability to make creative application, in their day-by-day practice, of the vivifying Marxist-Leninist theory.

Leninist methods of managing military cadres and of working with them represent the dialectical aggregate of methods and means contributing to the most fruitful decision of all problems of military construction, taking into consideration past experience, the demands of the present-day situation, and the prospects for further development. Those methods are characterized by the following most important principles: party-mindedness; the combination of revolutionary scope with communist efficiency and concreteness in work; the consideration of political-morale and on-the-job qualities; reliance upon the creative activity and initiative of the masses; the correct combination of methods of conviction and coercion; trust in the cadres and the checking of execution of the tasks given to them; the education of the cadres in the spirits of the demands made by the moral code for a builder of communism; and their promotion in conformity with the level of their abilities and training. These very important principles are organically

interrelated and dialectically supplement one another, forming a well-organized system of methods of working with the cadres.

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The principles of Leninist management were elaborated and formed during the process of the struggle of the working class for the victory of the socialist revolution and for the strengthening of the world's first socialist state. Their system is of a revolutionary nature, devoid of dogmatism, stagnation, and routine. The life and activity of Lenin represent the embodiment of the new methods in work, which combine within themselves on the one hand, the revolutionary scope inherent in the working class and its party, and, on the other hand, Bolshevik efficiency and the ability to solve posed tasks persistently, to carry out plans that have been set down, and to move step by step to the final goal.

Leninist methods characterize the entire activity of the Communist Party and its Central Committee with regard to the construction of communism in our country. Relying upon Leninist principles, the party is boldly revealing shortcomings in various fields of economic, state, and military construction, decisively tearing down obstacles that retard our further movement ahead, and opening up vistas for the broad creative initiative and revolutionary energy of the masses.

In the process of preparation for its 23rd Congress, the Communist Party and its Central Committee are acting as models of management and the application of Leninist methods in work, and devoting continuous attention to the introduction of those methods into the practical activity of party, state, and military cadres.

Great importance is attached to the principles of Leninist methods of management in the practical work of the military cadres, commanders, and chiefs at all echelons, who are entrusted with the responsible and honorable task of controlling the troops and of achieving a constant rise in the level of combat power and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Leninist principles of management assured the Communist Party of the mobilization of the masses for the decisive assault against autocracy and contributed to the successful completion of the socialist revolution. For the solution of that grandiose task it was necessary to have "the gigantically bold, historically great, and completely selfless and enthusiastic initiative and scope of a truly revolutionary class" (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch. (Complete Collected Works), Vol 32, page 406). Revolutionary scope and efficiency became a remarkable tradition for our state, party, and military cadres.

In the successes of the heroic armed defense of the young Soviet republic during the years of the civil war and foreign intervention, a tremendous role was also played by the Leninist principles of management

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of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War also was an effective realization of Leninist principles of management of methods of working with cadres.

The successful carrying out of the grandiose tasks of communist construction in our country, as proclaimed by the Program of the CPSU, convincingly indicates that the combination of revolutionary scope and communist efficiency remains a very important factor in the solution of fundamental problems of economic, political, and military construction.

The successes achieved in the rearmament of the Soviet Army and Navy, the creation of new types of armed forces, and the fundamental changes in the organization of the troops and the methods of armed combat represent the direct consequence of the skillful application of that Leninist principle in the strengthening of the defense capacity of our Motherland. Revolutionary scope and communist efficiency are that vivifying force without which movement forward would be impossible, a force which stimulates the mind and gives one perspective.

The generals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces have a thorough understanding of the prospects for modern military construction, and are ably and boldly reorganizing their work as applicable to the new conditions, mobilizing broad masses of the fighting men for the mastery, within the shortest time periods, of the most complex combat technology, armament, and methods of their combat use.

The communist efficiency of our military cadres represents the maximum state of organization, state of discipline, and responsibility. It is an antidote to a superficial approach to the job. Without this demand made upon the cadres, serious work would be unthinkable.

When contrasting to "revolutionary" idle talk the simple everyday affairs and communist efficiency, V. I. Lenin at that time decisively castigated the disease of unprincipled utilitarianism, which infrequently leads workers, even those full of will and practical decisiveness but devoid of perspective, to serious errors. "Narrow-minded practicalism" and "headless utilitarianism" are the terms given to that disease by Lenin.

The Leninist concept of efficiency lies in the concreteness of the management of organizational work, in the ability to bring it to its conclusion, to achieve real results by painstaking everyday work. At the same time the Leninist demand of efficiency denies philistine, mundane problems and the digging among petty details. On the contrary, it presupposes the complete consideration of the actual conditions, the ability to see the immediate and the long-range prospects, to combat routine and stagnation, to direct creative efforts to those areas "where,

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most of all, the new is being constructed" (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 37, page 91).

Herein lies the capability of our military cadres to combine revolutionary scope with efficiency in their official activity. At the present time it is especially necessary that our officers, generals, and admirals construct their entire activity upon a scientific basis, in a new way, with a consideration of the tasks of combat readiness for modern warfare. The success of that work depends not only upon ideological training, but also upon the level of the military knowledge and the on-the-job qualifications of our cadres. Life demands of them that they constantly master Marxism-Leninism, the theory of military affairs, the ability to effect the practical realization of the conclusions of military theory and to move ahead, to enrich it in practice.

Much has already been said about the fact that a sense of the new is a very valuable quality of our military cadres. The commanders or chiefs must systematically develop that quality within themselves and inculcate it in their subordinates, must support their intelligent initiative. "The matter lies in providing support to each and every outcropping of the new...." Soviet cadres were taught by V. I. Lenin (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 39, page 20). For the officer complement of our armed forces this Leninist instruction rings forth as an indispensable demand that they decisively support everything new, advanced, progressive, that they fight against obsolete views and conceptions, and that they mercilessly unmask those who hold those views and conceptions.

The complete revolution in military affairs, which has brought about the necessity of re-examining many fundamental problems of military construction, and the combat and operational training of the troops, has posed in a new way the question of the training of the military cadres themselves, the areas of their specialization, and has made increased demands upon their selection and education. There has arisen, for example, the necessity of sharply intensifying the attention devoted to the engineer-technical personnel, of defining in a new way their role and importance under conditions of the increased degree to which the army and navy are supplied with technical equipment. A military engineer must be viewed now not as a narrow specialist deciding only "purely technical" problems, but as a military specialist who has mastered military knowledge and who is capable not only of accepting and executing orders, but also, if necessary, of independently fulfilling responsible command functions.

These officers must be helped to develop their command habits and to acquire experience in working with people. It is known that anything new requires additional efforts, and certain directors attempt to brush the subject aside, because they are afraid of the difficulties and the certain amount of risk involved in assimilating that which is new.

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Marxism-Leninism teaches that we must go deep within the old. It is necessary attentively to observe past experience, to analyze it promptly and deeply, and to strive to find internal changes in it, so as to determine faithfully the tendencies of development. "Let's have a bit less intellectual and bureaucratic conceit," V. I. Lenin demanded, "and a bit more study of what our practical experience is yielding in the center and in the outlying districts, and what science has already given to us" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 42, page 347).

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Leninist methods in work are characterized by the isolation, from the diversity of unresolved problems, of the principal, the decisive problems, by concentrating on which the director is able to move ahead to the designated goal most successfully. If a commander or chief insufficiently thinks out the over-all direction to be taken in his work, if he does not isolate the critical matters on which it is necessary at the particular moment to direct his principal attention, there arises the danger that he is dissipating his efforts. It is precisely under these conditions that one most frequently observes the striving to cope with a posed task "just any old way," and Bolshevik efficiency is replaced by utilitarianism.

The characteristic feature of the Leninist methods of work -- the ability to organize the job on a practical basis -- expresses the essence and directedness of the work done by cadres. The practical organization of any job requires that the commander or chief proceed not from stereotype schemes, or ready-made formulas, but that he direct his subordinates to the solution of the task by relying on profound knowledge, experience, and a party sense. These methods of our command cadres introduce a high stage of organization into their activity, and helps to inculcate conscious discipline in the subordinates. The content of the organizer function of commanders is measured by the practical results, but the essence of that function is the conformity between the word and the deed, the high state of efficiency in work. This demand of Leninist methods pertains both to commanders and troops, and to chiefs of central institutions and organizations.

V. I. Lenin devoted much attention to efficiency in the organization of work. "At the present time the speakers," he wrote, "receive a summons to the session in general and they wait for hours. This is absolutely outrageous. It is necessary to strive for a situation in which the speakers are told to come at one definite hour,... and that the speakers do not wait more than 15 minutes" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 53, page 262).

These Leninist instructions continue to be valid in our time. Unfortunately, among our administrative cadres in troop units and especially in the center one still encounters individual officers and chiefs who have not made any conclusions from the party instructions concerning

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of administrative methods. Of course, it is incorrect to assume that sessions and meetings should not be held. But it is necessary to overcome the adherence to discussion, at meetings, of all the current problems, which requires the expenditure of efforts by a mass of people and of a large amount of time. Because much can and should be decided without sessions.

From that point of view an extremely interesting letter is that which was written by F. E. Dzerzhinskiy on 3 June 1925 to the administrative workers of the VSNKh /Higher Council of the National Economy/, entitled "The Fight Against Excesses in the Holding of Sessions." He wrote, "The greatest calamity for us at the present time is the infinite abundance of all kinds of sessions which eat up an infinite amount of time without providing sufficient results and which do not in any way compensate for the hours lost.... It may be that we should make it mandatory to introduce the custom, at each session, of raising as the first point the question of whether that session is necessary, and who among those present can and should be excused from participating in it, and whether or not the question could be resolved without the session!..."

High efficiency in work, a profound knowledge of special questions pertaining to military affairs are needed by the entire officer complement of our armed forces. This is especially required by the practice of training and educating the troops under the new conditions caused by the revolution in military matters.

The problem of training, selecting, and placing cadres occupies a special place in Leninist methods of management. V. I. Lenin considered that problem to be the chief, absolutely fundamental one in the organizational work of any manager. "One must study people and look for skillful workers. That's the principal thing now," he wrote. "Otherwise, all the orders and decrees are just meaningless pieces of paper" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 44, page 367).

The selection of cadres on the basis of their political and on-the-job qualities became the law of our party. They must have a thorough ideological grounding, must be devoted to the cause of communism, and capable of implementing the party policy, of mobilizing people to carry it out, and must possess other businesslike qualities. In a letter to Babushkin, Lenin wrote, "... To hell with all these conciliators, these people with 'subtle views,' and milksops!! A little fish is better than a big cockroach. It's better to have two or three energetic and completely devoted people than a dozen dawdlers" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 46, page 256). That is Lenin's teaching concerning the approach to the selection of cadres on the basis of political and businesslike qualities. It is precisely that principle that makes it possible most correctly and most efficiently to utilize cadres, their knowledge, abilities, and experience.

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The day-by-day practice of the Party indicates that many of the shortcomings that we now have in work are explained primarily by reasons of a subjective nature: poor work with cadres, the lack of the necessary commander's demandingness, lack of initiative, lack of activity, and sometimes even the lack of responsibility on the part of individual commanders and chiefs when executing their official duties. Sometimes these errors are made regularly by people, and therefore the Ministry of Defense requires the decisive elimination of those personnel who have shown themselves to be incapable of correcting the errors and miscalculations in their activities.

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The level of management, the selection and placement of cadres are inseparably linked with check on proper execution. Lack of such check is a sign of weakness on the part of the manager and poor organization of work. It is completely obvious that without systematic control and checking of execution, even the most conscientious people begin to work more poorly. It is not by chance that V. I. Lenin regularly demanded that that important principle of management not be forgotten. Lack of checking in military life, he said, means absolute ruin (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 51, page 50).

Control and checking, in the Leninist sense, consists in the critical analysis of the work done by subordinates, in the rendering of timely assistance to them. When revealing shortcomings, the commander publicizes the desirable experience gained in the work done by subordinates, and takes all steps to strive to extend that experience. This activity of the commander is closely linked with disciplinary practice.

The absolute majority of our commanders and chiefs check and study the trends in the entire official activity and life of their subordinates, inculcating in them a spirit of high consciousness. Unfortunately, one frequently encounters instances in which individual commanders or chiefs assume that checking on execution means waiting for the established period of time indicated by the decree, directive, or instruction, and then ascertaining what was done and what was not done. This is nothing else but a passive, contemplative attitude which contradicts the principles of Leninist methods of management and the spirit of party-mindedness in work. The checking of execution and the organization of the work represent a single process. Therein lies the essence of the checking of execution and its concomitant organizer work.

A source of the high consciousness of our officer personnel is their profound knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the clear understanding of the universal historical tasks which are being decided by the Soviet people under the guidance of the Communist Party. A broad political outlook and complete devotion to the ideals of communism are the chief and determining factor in the education and training of the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy.

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Ideological conviction presupposes the reconcilability of our cadres to the bourgeois psychology of private ownership and presupposes a solicitous attitude to socialist property. The protection of state interests and the good of the people is absolutely first for the Soviet officer. That quality present in military cadres is inseparably linked with their high adherence to principle, with the unequivocal and consistent conducting of the party line in all matters of military construction.

It is known that an unprincipled manager is held captive by obsolete ideas and moods, loses his footing in work, tries to conceal the miscalculations made by his subordinates, and thus inflicts great harm on the over-all cause.

There have been instances when individual chiefs who have recommended a subordinate for promotion by the efficiency-report procedure, express a derogatory opinion concerning him when it comes down to a matter of his promotion by way of carrying out the conclusions of the efficiency report. When submitting the name of a general or officer for retirement into the reserve, such chiefs refrain from direct, frank conversation with him, and transfer the initiative concerning the retirement onto personnel workers.

In the armed forces the criticism of the orders and decisions of commanders and chiefs is absolutely inadmissible, and all the military personnel must thoroughly understand this. But some of our administrative cadres make insufficient utilization of criticism and self-criticism as an effective method of educating the cadres. Unfortunately, even now one encounters instances of an intolerable attitude on the part of individual commanders even to businesslike comments directed to them not only by their subordinates, but also by their chiefs. And yet healthy criticism, even under conditions of the army and navy, is completely not counterindicated, but rather is a most important means of forming personality. Criticism and self-criticism have become a revolutionary tradition in Soviet society, including the life and activity of the army and navy. That tradition evolves from the Leninist methods of work, and is constantly developing and constantly becoming enriched with new content. One must not underevaluate the danger and harm of the tendency to make less utilization, under army and navy conditions, of that very important revolutionary method of educating our military cadres. It is precisely criticism and self-criticism which contribute to increasing the extent to which our cadres have a personal interest in eliminating the errors and miscalculations in their work.

Without a doubt, the only criticism and self-criticism which are supported in our society are those which reinforce the positions of society itself. We decisively reject that criticism which is directed at undermining the foundations of that society. Criticism must be of a

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istic denial of absolutely everything cannot bring anything but harm. "Whoever, because of the struggle against the perversion of the new order, forgets its content," he said, "whoever forgets that the working class created and is running a state of the Soviet type, is simply unable to think and is just talking idly" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 44, page 106).

This instruction of Lenin is especially important under army and navy conditions. The fundamental basis of criticism is its objectivity. It is always necessary to remember that damage can be inflicted both by overexaggeration of undesirable phenomena and errors and by a striving to whitewash the actual state of affairs. Criticism and self-criticism must always reflect the truth of life. The chief purpose of criticism is the task of correcting a person, of helping him to get rid of his shortcomings. It must contribute to the development and strengthening of discipline, to the increasing of the combat readiness of the troops. The success of criticism, the effectiveness of that criticism, as Lenin emphasized, depend upon how the party organizations create the opportunities under which each Soviet citizen is assured that he will find support and that his correct critical comments will be implemented. This Leninist demand has a direct bearing upon the working methods of the political agencies and our army and navy party organizations.

Experience shows that criticism develops successfully when it is actively supported and, on the basis of businesslike critical comments and suggestions, effective steps are taken. Wherever lack of principle manifests itself and wherever concern is shown not so much for the interests of the job as for a "peaceful life," there will always be stagnation in work and only imaginary well-being.

Leninist principles of management demand of commanders and military chiefs that they persistently combat even the slightest manifestations of suppression of criticism, that they persistently combat mutual covering up of errors, toadyism, and the unjustified extolling of services and merits, all of which, unfortunately, still occur in practice. And even if they are individual, specific instances, they still are intolerable under army and navy conditions.

It is generally known that adherence to party principles in all instances must combine with high commander's demandingness toward oneself and toward one's subordinates, with the rigid personal responsibility of the administration "for the fulfillment of definite, clearly and unambiguously outlined, tasks and practical work" (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 37, page 365).

Of especial importance for the strengthening of the armed forces and the education of the cadres is scientific criticism in the field of

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military theory and modern military affairs. In this direction the decisive role is played by the principle of the party approach to scientific criticism. Questions of party-mindedness in military science and scientific criticism have, in our time, taken on still greater importance. This is explained by the increased role of science in the development of society and of military science in military construction, and consequently, in the training of military cadres and the formation of the new fighting man. This work now would be unthinkable with the planned and complete utilization of the achievements of military pedagogics and psychology and of other sciences which our educator-commanders must possess.

The intensification of the ideological struggle on the international arena demands that one pose sharply, and in complete adherence to party principles, the questions of the unmasking of the bourgeois military ideology. Unfortunately, in the practice of scientific criticism the principle of party-mindedness is not always carried out sufficiently consistently. Not infrequently, critical reviews in the periodical press pose questions in an objectivistic way, without linking them with the class elucidation of the problem. There still are very few sharp, fundamentally critical research works in the field of the unmasking of the ideological diversionary tactics of imperialism against the countries of the socialist camp. Little is being done to unmask the so-called "theories" of the "lack of class structure" in bourgeois armies, of the "lack of party affiliation" of bourgeois military science, and other "theories" which present the party, class interests of the monopolies as being "public" or "nation-wide." The task of raising military-scientific criticism to a higher level is a very important party task of our military-scientific cadres. A means to be used in this noble task is provided by Leninist work methods, and the high personal responsibility of each military-scientific worker.

The high personal responsibility and demandingness of the command cadres are defined by our military regulations. They are required everywhere: not only in scientific activity, but also in day-by-day educational work, and in the assuring of the proper military discipline among the troops and at headquarters.

Under present-day conditions the role and importance of discipline have increased still more. The complex combat technology which our military cadres and the entire personnel of the armed forces now have to deal with, as well as other factors linked with the nature of nuclear warfare, demand of military cadres the greatest cohesion and precision in the work done by the personnel, the exceptional execution of assignments, the strictest, unconditional fulfillment of the demands contained in instructions, manuals, and regulations, and the orders and decrees of commanders and chiefs.

Even in the past, without iron military discipline, achievements in training, and victories in combat or an operation, would have been unthinkable. And without that iron discipline, they are even more impossible in present-day warfare.

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The most essential shortcoming in the work methods of reinforcing military discipline and order in certain units and on ships consists, in our opinion, in the fact that, instead of a scientific approach to the analysis and evaluation of shortcomings in disciplinary practice, individual commanders and political workers limit themselves to pointless criticism. Therefore, in their work with cadres to strengthen their military discipline, the chief step in analysis is lost -- the explanation of the concrete causes of the individual undesirable occurrences. A scientific, party-minded approach requires a profound, objective study of the reasons for the violations of military discipline and order in the units and elements. By correctly applying Leninist principles of management and methods of working with the cadres, our commanders and military chiefs are revealing the reasons for the occurrences of breaches of discipline and are finding scientifically substantiated measures for eliminating them.

When speaking of methods of managing people, V. I. Lenin attached great importance to the principle of one-man management. At the September 1965 Plenary Session of the Central Committee, our party re-emphasized the primary importance of that principle in the administration of industry. And one-man management and personal responsibility have still greater importance in the armed forces. Without the strict and consistent implementation of this most important principle of military construction, any successful work in the army and navy would be unthinkable. By realizing and firmly carrying out that principle, our commanders and chiefs also utilize collectiveness in their work. It is known that reliance upon the creativity and activity of the masses constitutes the party basis of one-man management. "The one and only way that the communist manager must prove his right to manage," V. I. Lenin explained, "is by finding himself many, more and more, assistants ... by knowing how to help them work, to promote them, to indicate their experience and take it into consideration" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 42, page 325). This teaching of V. I. Lenin should always be remembered by our military cadres.

The strict regulation of the entire life and activity in the army and navy on the basis of regulations, manuals, and orders and instructions of commanders and chiefs does not eliminate the necessity of developing the creative opportunities for subordinates in their process of the execution of their duties. Inculcating the feeling of high responsibility in each officer for the job assigned to him is impossible with the manifestation of businesslike initiative by him. Creative, rather than unthinking, execution raises our military cadres to a

higher level, reveals their capabilities, and inculcates a precious feeling of personal responsibility for the execution of military duty.

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In our time a statement which is especially vital is that one which was made by V. I. Lenin, to the effect that a conscientious worker must feel that he is not only the boss in his own plant, but also the representative of the country, that he must feel personal responsibility. These words of Lenin pertain, to varying degrees, to each person in the armed forces. All this means that it is necessary to wage a constant struggle against the ignoring of the opinions of subordinates and their suggestions made in the army collective. Unfortunately, one often has to observe that a particular commander not only does not listen to the opinion of his subordinates, but also, putting it simply, cannot stand having equals alongside of him, much less anyone who surpasses him in a particular area. All this hinders the development and inculcation of the high responsibility of our cadres and hinders their growth. It is not by chance that here and there there has gradually begun to develop a type of executive deputy who, it would appear, is, according to his assignment, not supposed to think, create, or search.

It is completely obvious that this type of deputy cannot become a successor to the person for whom he is acting as the deputy. In certain instances the counteraction to this faulty practice on the part of senior commanders and chiefs is not always effective. It is understandable that it is precisely this practice which has a detrimental influence upon the development of young talented cadres and which fails to guarantee effective succession in management. There are no irreplaceable administrators, and, as is well known, assignments are not given in perpetuity. One generation of administrative cadres leaves and another arrives, adopts the traditions, absorbs the preceding experience, and continues to carry on the work. In this regard, relying on the requirements of the Leninist style of administration, I should like to discuss the great importance of the personal example of the administrative cadres.

Our officer cadres, in the overwhelming majority of instances, are well trained and know their job, and the senior educator-commander, checking the execution of his decision, always successfully strives to improve the work methods. Communicating with them locally, he also enriches himself with new knowledge and experience. The senior chief must remember that others will always listen attentively to his opinion with special attention, will take over his working style, and sometimes even his manner of speaking, will compare his words with his deeds, will learn from him the ability to be demanding and strict, but just and attentive, to people, the ability to have a self-critical attitude to one's own work. We often forget that this approach of a senior to his subordinates is the best application in practice of the principle of Leninist administrative methods -- communication with the masses.

taking this into consideration, Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky, speaking to commanders and chiefs, said, "Strive for the situation in which each of you could be given this evaluation -- a demanding commander and a good comrade."

Such features as honesty and justice, modesty and simplicity, are organically inherent in Leninist work methods. Need one say that the authority of our administrative cadres, the confidence and acknowledgment of the masses are won by businesslike modesty and simplicity, attention to people, an honest attitude to the job, and the moral purity of the commander or chief? There is good reason why the common expression says that it is not the job that distinguishes the man, but it is the man who distinguishes the job. V. I. Lenin always displayed dissatisfaction when he noted that his working comrades extolled his services to the party and the working class. "You cannot imagine," he said, "the extent to which this constant promotion of my personality is unpleasant to me." Speaking to his working comrades, he stated, "It would be awkward for me myself to prohibit this type of thing. But you should gradually apply the brakes to this whole business." Being at the height of position in our time means displaying great demandingness to oneself, without giving oneself the slightest rebate. It is inadmissible when albeit a small number of our administrative cadres say, "I am an administrator and I can do what others are not authorized to do."

To our chagrin, one can still encounter that type of worker who loves to promise in words not only what it is possible and desirable to do, but also what it is unauthorized or impossible to do. That is how the lack of confidence in the chief's words is gradually reinforced. In the army and navy this is absolutely intolerable. The subordinate must believe every word of his chief, he must trust him the way he trusts himself. Only then can the chief be assured that his order will be executed by his subordinates conscientiously, unquestioningly, precisely, and at the proper time.

Our generals, admirals, and officers are marching shoulder to shoulder to the common goal, like true friends and comrades. The type of administrative workers about whom we spoke earlier by way of criticizing their working methods can be numbered on the fingers of our hands. But they do exist, and this is sometimes explained by errors made in the selection of cadres. Work with cadres is a difficult job, and a delicate and necessarily soul-searching one.

A worker in a personnel agency must have a good knowledge of the on-the-job and political aspects of the cadres of the sector assigned to him, he must know their personal qualities, strong and weak points, shortcomings which hinder them in specific work, their family status, their vocation, their moods and desires. This will make it possible for any commander to make the most objective and best-directed recommendations concerning the placement of the cadres. There will be less

subjectivism and fewer errors. In our opinion, it is desirable to assign workers in personnel agencies to definite sectors for a longer period of time. Experience shows that the frequent rotation of officers not only among the troops, but also in personnel agencies, is actually detrimental.

When speaking about the basic principles of administration and the Leninist methods of working with military cadres, it is necessary to emphasize that the Communist Party, when educating Soviet military cadres, requires that they actively combat backward glances, that they do not "flatter the masses," do not trail behind whiners and people of little faith, and that they boldly and firmly move forward against the current, if that is required by the interests of the cause, convincing the masses, mobilizing them for the active and conscious solution of the tasks confronting them.

Leninist work methods presuppose not only a good knowledge of our cadres, but also a careful attitude toward them, constant concern for their needs and demands. V. I. Lenin showed constant concern for people, had an attentive attitude to each question that disturbed the workers, he was strict and was absolutely intolerant of bureaucratism. He was interested in literally everything: the small and the big, the administrators and the ordinary people.

V. I. Lenin was absolutely implacable toward those who looked down on the people from on high, who had an indifferent attitude to the labor and experience of that people, and their thoughts and demands. "In the masses of the people," he said, "we are still just a drop in the ocean, and we can administer only when we correctly express that which the people is conscious of" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 45, page 112).

Leninist concern for people must constantly serve as an example to be imitated by our commanders and chiefs. It is a characteristic feature of their methods of administering military cadres.

Leninist methods are especially necessary for our military-scientific and command cadres under present-day conditions, when large creative searches are underway for new forms of the organization of the troops and methods of combat actions which correspond to the increased level of the technical status of the army and navy.

Our party, confirming the Leninist principles of administration, adopted from Lenin the characteristic features of his methods of activity and always turns to them when it is confronted with new tasks.

At its plenary sessions in October and November 1964 and March and September 1965, the Central Committee of the party sharply censured

CRITICISM OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THE IMPERIALIST MILITARY IDEOLOGY

Colonel K. Spirov

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The essence, content, and nature of the philosophical, political, and military ideas, and theories of every class are determined by that position which the particular class occupies in social life.

The working class and its Marxist-Leninist parties, which have an interest in a truly scientific explanation of phenomena of nature and society, make consistent use of the scientific philosophy of dialectical and historical materialism. Life convincingly confirms that scientific dialectical-materialist methodology is an inseparable prerequisite for the correct and successful decision by the Communist Party and by the Soviet state of the tasks of the policy, theory, and practice of construction and development of the armed forces of the socialist state.

Imperialist military ideology and science also have their philosophical and methodological base but, with a rare exception, modern imperialist military ideologists and theoreticians prefer not to acknowledge openly the existence of a definite philosophical basis of their views, ideas, and theories. Moreover, many bourgeois military ideologists and theoreticians deny the link between philosophy, on the one hand, and their military ideology and science, on the other. Not infrequently this manifests itself in the statement that military ideology and science, in and of themselves, are a "philosophy of war" or a "military philosophy."

Engels stated that in the bourgeois society "naturalists imagine that they are free from philosophy when they ignore or berate it" (K. Marks, F. Engel's Marx, Engels, Soch., Vol 20, page 524). Without a doubt this also pertains to certain bourgeois military theoreticians who are convinced that military theory does not have anything in common with those varieties of idealistic philosophy which are studied in educational institutions in almost all the capitalist countries. But, as Engels said, "... as a result, they still prove to be subordinated to philosophy..., which is unfortunately for the greater part the most unpleasant, and those who abuse philosophy most of all are the slaves precisely of the worst vulgarized remnants of the worst philosophical teachings" (Ibid., pages 524-525).

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subjectivist methods and administrative methods in work, characterizing them as voluntarism having nothing in common with Leninism.

Wherein, then, lie the most important peculiarities of the Leninist principles of administration and work with cadres? They lie:

-- in high adherence to ideology and party principles on the part of our cadres, in the critical analysis of the results of their work, all of which are necessary conditions for correct administration;

-- in the ability to combine revolutionary scope with Bolshevik efficiency, to be guided always and in everything by the theory of Marxism-Leninism as the scientific basis of military construction, the ability not to disregard small matters, not to lose sight of the higher goal, and always to coordinate and to compare all decisions and actions with that goal;

-- in the ability to isolate the main trends, tasks, and the basic links in the chain for the attainment of the goal, in the support and dissemination of advanced initiative, in the sense of the new, as necessary conditions for success;

-- in the skillful selection, education, and placement of cadres, the constant checking of their activity, the checking of the execution of decisions, as the absolutely fundamental principle of Leninist administration, in the unity of decision and execution, word and deed;

-- in the inseparable bond with the masses, as a most important condition for the correctness and party-mindedness of administration;

-- in the ability to rely upon the masses, political agencies, and party organizations, to consult with them for the making of the most correct decision;

-- in the manifestation of genuine concern for subordinates, attention and sensitivity to comrades in the service, in simplicity and modesty, precision and justice, and demandingness on the part of administrators to their subordinates;

-- in the efficiency, concreteness, directedness, and the positive personal example of administrative cadres in their work with subordinates.

In work with cadres, all officers, generals, and admirals must always rely on Leninist principles of administration and work methods, must persistently develop them, and use them not only in practice in ideological educational activity, but also when training cadres in modern military affairs.

As an example illustrating the justness of this remark of Engels, one may cite the views of the same General Decker and Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson. In their statement that "military doctrine is, in and of itself a philosophy," one can see the reflection of the rehash of one of the idealistic philosophical schools, so-called positivism. The latter denies the existence of over-all natural laws in the development of nature, society, and thought, and rejects philosophy as an independent science and its methodological importance for the concrete sciences. The basic conclusion of positivism consists in that each concrete science supposedly has "its own philosophy." Thus, the opinions of those military theoreticians who at first glance completely reject philosophy as a world outlook and methodology, express a definite antiscientific philosophical trend.

The military ideologists of imperialism attempt to theoretically "substantiate" the necessity and possibility of the elaboration of concrete methods of destroying by military means the world-wide system of socialism, of restoring the dominance of capitalism throughout the world, and of suppressing revolutionary movements. Not only in politics, but also in the ideology, "the commanding bourgeoisie, out of fear of the growing and the strengthened proletariat, supports everything that is backward, obsolescent, and medieval" (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 23, page 166). Their reliance upon the most reactionary antiscientific philosophical teachings has, consequently, social roots.

The profound crisis which the entire bourgeois ideology and its component part, philosophy, are now undergoing manifests itself primarily in the fact, as mentioned in the Program of the CPSU, that bourgeois teachings and schools "could not and cannot provide a scientific answer to questions being advanced by life." Their conclusions do not withstand the checking of practical life.

The reactionary, anticommunist direction of the imperialistic military ideology and science are inseparable from eclecticism, idealism, metaphysics, and irrationalism as a world-outlook and methodological basis. The peculiarity here consists in the fact that the military ideology and science of imperialism as a whole, and each theoretician individually, express not a separate philosophical direction, but an eclectic mishmash of various philosophical schools and directions -- from subjective and objective idealism to elemental materialism, from the purest metaphysics to elements of Hegelian dialectics, from agnosticism to elements of the materialistic theory of reflection.

At the same time it would be an error to equate the philosophical fundamentals of imperialistic military ideology and military science. They do have something in common in their world-outlook and methodological foundations, about which mention was made earlier, but they also

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have substantial differences which are linked with the immediate social functions, on the one hand, of military ideology, and on the other hand, of military science, although they serve one and the same class purpose. The military ideology of imperialism has its cutting edge directed at the justification of exploitation, the stupefying of the broad masses of the workers, and the apologetics of imperialist wars. But military theory, which is intended to contribute to the attainment of imperialist goals by military means, is called upon to generalize the practice of the preparation and conducting of armed combat, the construction of the armed forces, to analyze their own and the enemy's actual military capabilities, and to search for means of attaining victory in warfare.

The need for the correct cognition of military affairs pushes bourgeois military theoreticians onto the path of recognizing and explaining the military-technical aspect of war from the positions of elemental materialism and inconsistent dialectics. When a particular theoretician is studying the technical aspect of military affairs, he is interested in the correct cognition of the objective reality and is capable, to a definite extent, of doing this. But unlike nature, in military affairs everything manifests itself through the actions of peoples; in the struggle between classes, states, and social systems, definite political tasks are solved. In military theory, the military-technical aspect is also linked with the social-political, that is, with the world outlook and class interests of the military theoretician himself and, as a whole, the interests of the reactionary monopolistic oligarchy which is served by bourgeois military science. The definition provided by V. I. Lenin for bourgeois scientists is applicable in full measure to bourgeois military theoreticians: "Not a single one of these professors, who are capable of providing the most valuable works in special fields of chemistry, history, and physics, can be believed, not even for a single word, once the discussion comes around to philosophy. Why? For the very same reason that not a single professor of political economics, capable of providing the most valuable works in the field of factual, specialized research, can be believed, not even for a single word, once the discussion comes around to the general theory of political economics. Because that latter is the same kind of party science in modern society that gnosiology is. In general and as a whole, the professor economists are nothing else but learned henchmen of the capitalist class, and the professors of philosophy are learned henchmen of the theologians" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 18, pages 363-364).

Let us consider in more detail certain questions of the philosophical content of the military ideology and military theories of imperialism.

Modern imperialist military ideology represents the sum total of the views and ideas of the monopoly bourgeoisie, which substantiate and justify the preparation and the conducting of an aggressive war against

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the USSR, wars against revolutionary forces -- the working class and the masses of the workers -- in the capitalist countries, predatory wars against states which have attained their independence, colonial wars against the national-liberation movement, as well as wars against imperialist competitors. At the same time that ideology poses as its task the justification of the militarization of the state apparatus and the policy of the arms race and the aggravation of the international tension.

Until the over-all crisis of capitalism, a narrow circle of ideologists engaged in problems of military ideology, and there was no special apparatus for propagandizing its ideas among the masses of the people. At the present time, military ideology occupies a very important place in the political system of working over the masses of the people. Special ministries of propaganda, information, and education, and bourgeois parties, political figures, and publicists are constantly engaged in elaborating and propagandizing that ideology. The persistent inculcation of military ideology is carried out via the radio, television, motion pictures, the church, schools, universities, the periodical press, and literature. In many capitalist states after the Second World War, within the military departments there was created a large-scale and well-ramified apparatus of ideological pressure upon the personnel in the armed forces, an apparatus which also constantly propagandizes the military ideology among the civilian population of these countries.

During the present-day era, when the world-wide capitalist system as a whole is ripe for the social revolution of the proletariat, anticommunism has become the basic content of the imperialist military ideology. With the aim of guaranteeing the active participation of the masses in imperialistic wars, of drawing them away from the revolutionary struggle, the ideologists of imperialism are using all methods to inculcate in the consciousness of the people hatred for communism.

Relying on modern bourgeois philosophy and sociology, the military ideologists of imperialism widely propagandize the views concerning the "eternity" and the fatal inevitability of wars, "the wiping out of differences" between the concepts "war" and "peace" under present-day conditions, and attempt to prove the allegedly existing natural law governing the increase in the role of military management in state administration and the "inevitability" of the militarization of modern bourgeois states, as well as the necessity of the establishment of dictator regimes in all the countries of the world.

In order to "substantiate" these views they utilized modern bourgeois philosophical and sociological trends from objective idealism and subjective sociology to vulgar social Darwinism. These philosophical and sociological trends are premeditatively supported and disseminated by imperialism because imperialism has an interest in substantiating

its views of world development and in concealing its reactionary essence from the masses of the people. Of the numerous idealistic and vulgar materialistic sociological conceptions one should note the ones which are widely utilized by the imperialistic military ideologists.

The principal place in modern military ideology of imperialism is occupied by the basically idealistic, so-called conception of defense of the "free world," the conception of the "spiritual freedom of personality." The essence of this conception is that the primary factor, the determining one in social life, should not be considered to be social existence, not the material aspect of the life of society, but the so-called "spiritual freedom" which allegedly exists only under conditions of capitalism.

Under the guise of "protection against communism," the militant wing of the idealistic philosophy openly proposes an ideological, political, and economic struggle carried on against the world-wide system of socialism, and proposes that that struggle should be culminated by a new world war. Thus, the religious-political organization "Moral Rearmament," which has branches in many capitalist and young independent states in Asia and Africa, circulated millions of copies of the pamphlet Ideology and Coexistence. This reactionary libel begins with the statement that the "Third World War has already begun. As long ago as 1918 ... the Soviets worked out their plans for the destruction and enslavement of the Western world with the aid of a war of ideas.... Communism has a plan for the seizure of every country" [retranslated from Russian]. The conclusion of this slanderous pamphlet is that, in the struggle against communism, "it is necessary to have the unification of ideological and military factors" [retranslated].

The most brilliant manifestation of the reactionary nature of militant idealism is provided by the slogans of the imperialistic military ideology: "Better to atomize than communize," or "Better dead than Red." The former slogan took on a semiofficial nature in the United States during the crisis in the Caribbean, and the latter is the official slogan of the ruling party in West Germany, the CDU-CSU [Christian Democratic Union -- Christian Socialist Union]. The latter slogan is utilized, in particular, to justify the nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr and the affirmation of the so-called "strategy of front lines." The slogan "protection of the free world from communist infiltration" is used by the United States Government to justify its aggressive actions against the peoples of Vietnam, Latin America, and the preparation for a world-wide nuclear war.

In the ideological processing of the broad masses of the workers, especially the personnel of the imperialist armies, in recent times more attention than formerly has been devoted to the idealistic religious substantiation of wars as a means of combatting "communist

atheism." Extremely telling in this regard is the fact that the text
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of the oath taken by American soldiers, as approved in 1962 by the United
States Congress, contains a reference to God's help in protecting the
United States from foreign and domestic enemies. The entire militaristic
ideology in West Germany is completely saturated with religious
justifications. The leading political and military figures in the CDU-
CSU and in the West German Government constantly cite the fact that the
only person worthy of eternal bliss is the one who "in this world" re-
mains a Christian and a militant enemy of socialism. "If, for example,"
the head of the Protestant Church in Germany and the chief bishop of
NATO, Dibelius, stated, "one hydrogen bomb kills a million people, its
victims will attain eternal life all the sooner." "Justifying" the re-
quirement for granting the Bundeswehr atomic weapons and a leading role
in NATO, Adenauer, as far back as 1960, when speaking to the Germans,
said, "God has bestowed on the German nation a special role in the pres-
ent troubled times, by making the Germans the protectors of the West...."

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Precisely in this direction at the present time a large amount
of attention has been devoted to the religious working over of the sol-
diers in the imperialist armies. Even articles concerning space flights,
architecture, and the history of wars, which are printed, for example,
in the magazine Die Bundeswehr, are adapted to prove the "existence and
omnipotence" of God. A vast apparatus of churchmen in all the capital-
ist armies are responsible for the religious processing of the personnel.

The religious-idealistic substantiation of wars and of militarism
is constructed with reliance on the fact that millions of the working
masses, including a considerable number of soldiers in the capitalist
countries, still believe in God, and believe in churchmen as the preach-
ers of the "word of God" on earth. In an atmosphere of military hys-
teria and military psychosis, religion is assigned the immediate task
of drawing the masses of the people away from the active struggle for
peace, the task of forcing them to reconcile themselves to the inevita-
bility of war, of believing that the source of wars is not imperialism,
but socialism.

The increase in atheism, especially among the working class, the
social awakening of the broad masses of the people, their recognition
of the necessity of carrying on the struggle for social reforms and for
peace, and against warmongers -- all these factors have forced certain
churchmen to take a realistic path of acknowledging the necessity of
lessening the international tension, and of banning nuclear weapons.
Such, in particular, was the position of the late Pope John XXIII, a
number of the participants at the Vatican Assembly, and Pope Paul VI.
However, in the speech made by Paul VI at the session of the United Na-
tions General Assembly on 4 October 1965, in addition to a summons for
disarmament, the prevention, and censuring of all wars in general (and,
consequently, even just wars), he said, "people cannot be brothers if

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They are not humble, the struggle for prestige, the striving for a higher position, colonialism, and egoism...."

There is no necessity to attempt to prove that such an idealistic explanation diverts people from a correct understanding of the source of wars, the arms race, and international tension, and diverts them from ascertaining the causes of colonialism.

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In addition to the religious "substantiations" of the military ideology of imperialism, its apologists also spread widely other, just as idealistic, "psychological" and racist theories of the eternity and inevitability of wars. Their essence consists in the fact that people and entire races have, since time immemorial, allegedly been inclined to bellicosity, to the use of arms to assert their domination over other people and races. The social demagoguery of the "psychological" theories is directly aimed at undermining the confidence of peoples in the peace-loving policy of the socialist states. It attempts to "refute" the principle of Marxism-Leninism that socialism and peace are inseparable and that even now it is possible to prevent a world war. The imperialist ideologists make wide use of anti-Leninist statements made by schismatics and adventurists in the ranks of certain communist parties on problems of war and peace in order to convince the masses of the people in the national tension, and of banning nuclear weapons. Such, in particular, was the position of the late Pope John XXIII, a number of the participants at the Vatican Assembly, and Pope Paul VI. However, in the speech made by Paul VI at the session of the United Nations General Assembly on 4 October 1965, in addition to a summons for disarmament, the prevention, and censuring of all wars in general (and, consequently, even just wars), he said, "people cannot be brothers if they are not humble. It is pride ... which gives rise to tension and the struggle for prestige, the striving for a higher position, colonialism, and egosim...."

There is no necessity to attempt to prove that such an idealistic explanation diverts people from a correct understanding of the source of wars, the arms race, and international tension, and diverts them from ascertaining the causes of colonialism.

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AN especially large amount of attention is devoted to the psychological and racist conceptions of the explanation of the causes of wars by the present-day adherents of subjective idealism -- pragmatists and existentialists. The West German existentialist and "military philosopher" Karl Jaspers unambiguously entitled one of his works "The Atom Bomb." The chief idea of that book and Jaspers' philosophy is expressed in the statement that "there is no other way than the intensification of armament until such time that the world will be blown into small pieces and turned into cosmic dust." This "philosophical conception" is a component part of a revanchist ideology. It is not difficult to understand the great danger to the German people and mankind as a whole that would be posed by the followers of Jaspers' philosophy if they were to receive nuclear weapons.

One of the widespread theories in the ideological processing of the personnel of the imperialist armies is the pragmatic theory of "survival." The basic thesis of pragmatism consists in the fact that there is no objective truth, and the only true thing is that which is beneficial for the particular individual.

The theory of "survival" is the ideological justification of preventive warfare and sudden nuclear attack upon the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. It also serves as a justification of the perfidy and treachery of the United States policy with respect to their European NATO partners, and places a "theoretical" basis under the bestialities of the American soldiers in Vietnam, and Latin America, and in the event of war, against the peoples of the socialist countries.

It would be a serious error to underevaluate the pernicious influence of this "theory" upon the members of the American Armed Forces and, in general, upon a certain number of Americans. Millions of Americans, at the 1964 presidential election, voted for one of the zealous champions of the "philosophy of survival" -- Goldwater. The United States Government attempts to justify from pragmatic positions even the predatory bombings by American aviation of the peaceful population of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, calling its actions "retribution" and "strategic conviction" in favor of negotiations.

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"The cynical view has not by accident, become very widespread in the ideological and psychological processing of the personnel of the imperialist armies: the armed forces of Great Britain have been completely, and those of the United States have been nine-tenths manned with mercenaries, for whom service in the army and participation in predatory wars are a kind of "business." And the very philosophy of pragmatism is, by its social essence, a world outlook of a businessman, who denies the concepts of justice, duty, honor, patriotism, and service to the people, but is ready to commit any crime, so long as it promises a corresponding material advantage.

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Among the widespread theories of imperialist military ideology one should note the previously mentioned neomalthusianism. The views of Malthus, who explained social relations from the biological positions of the "struggle for existence," were "developed" after the Second World War by bourgeois sociologists for purposes of slandering socialism and the peoples who had achieved national independence, and to justify wars using means of mass destruction. From day to day the bourgeois press publishes accounts of the allegedly increasing gap between the increase in population in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the lagging production of consumer goods. Attempts are made from positions of neomalthusianism to "prove" that the "aggressiveness" of the Asiatic countries is explained by the large population and by the geographical conditions of their life. The most militant neomalthusians openly state that a future atomic war will only reduce the sufferings of hundreds of millions of people who would only die of hunger and deprivations anyway, since there allegedly are not enough food resources for the normal existence of the earth's population. In 1965, in the American magazine Saturday Evening Post, the former president of the American Chemical Society and Pentagon adviser Rossweller proposed the bold and decisive utilization of chemical and biological weapons "for the more humane and even charitable" annihilation of millions of people in a future war.

Certain other bourgeois theories also attempt to solve the tasks of justifying capitalism and of substantiating the inevitability of wars. Those theories differ only in their argumentation, but their philosophical content is one and the same: idealism, metaphysics, irrationalism, and not infrequently unabashed sophistry. For example, well-known British military ideologist and publicist B. Lidden Hart, in his book Deterrent or Defense, gives the following evaluation of the history of wars: "The study of the history of wars has led me to the conclusion that almost all wars could have been avoided and that in most instances war was begun by peace-loving state figures who lost their patience and who placed their opponents in a position from which they could not escape without serious damage to their prestige" [retranslated from Russian/ See Note/.

borona? /translation of Deterrent or Defense/, Ustrasheniye ili
188.

In this statement everything is topsy-turvy: wars are viewed as an accidental phenomenon, rather than the continuation of the aggressive predatory policy of the exploiter classes; the causes of wars, according to Hart, are the subjective qualities of the peace-loving figures, while the military criminals are only the victims of unfavorable conditions.

There is no necessity to consider other, less widespread directions and varieties of the theories of the imperialist military ideology. They are all united by the attempt to remove the blame from imperialism in the preparation and unleashing of wars, the striving to evoke hatred toward communism, and to make the masses of the people in the capitalist countries an obedient tool of militarism and aggression. Therefore, as a philosophical base the imperialist military ideology consciously chooses the "theories" of the most reactionary and militant obscurantists in the camp of the imperialist philosophers of the past and present.

The reactionary, antiscientific nature of the philosophical foundations of the imperialist military ideology does not mean, in any way, that it is incapable of exerting an influence upon definite segments of the working masses in the capitalist countries. Therefore it must be consistently and decisively opposed by all the progressive, anti-imperialist forces.

* * *

Prior to the First World War, the formation of the socialist state, and the creation of its armed forces, bourgeois military science viewed armed combat almost exclusively from the aspect of military technology. In the methodology of military sciences, elements of elemental materialism and dialectics during the analysis of the development of means and methods of conducting armed combat coexisted eclectically with an idealistic treatment of the decisive role of intuition and the will of the military leaders, with a metaphysical interpretation of the "eternal principles" of military art and the denial of the objective natural laws government war and armed combat.

The rapid development of military technology during the course of and after the First World War and of methods of conducting armed combat, and the revolution in military affairs after the Second World War effected a break in the metaphysical conceptions in military science. Certain military theoreticians, including D. Smith, M. Taylor, B. Brody, and others, in recent times have emphasized that they rely

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 on the dialectical method developed by Hegel and utilized in the research on military theory which was conducted by Clausewitz. The West German military theoretician Wilhelm von Schramm, in the magazine Wehrkunde, writes of the necessity, under present-day conditions, of restoring to its former rights the military philosophy of Clausewitz, including the dialectical approach to the analysis of the forms of the manifestation of war.

Of course, none of the bourgeois military theoreticians who are now raising dialectics onto the shield raises the question of materialistic dialectics, or the reflection, in subjective dialectics, of the dialectical development of objective reality. It is not by accident that they emphasize that they are concerned with Hegelian dialectics, viewed only as a method of thought which is subordinate to certain a priori rules and laws. This type of "dialectical method" is easily converted into sophistry, when it is applied subjectivistically. And sophistry, presented under the guise of dialectics, is frequently employed to "substantiate" subjectivistic and adventurist theories and conclusions. For example, General Pablo Supino, citing Hegelian dialectics, attempted to prove in the magazine Revue Militaire Generale that by the policy of the arms race and the constant threat of military aggression without war it is possible to achieve the morale-and-political capitulation of a probable enemy (Supino has in mind the world-wide system of socialism). M. Taylor revealed a critical attitude to the so-called strategy of "massive nuclear effect," but it turned out that his conceptions also were just as adventurist and lacking in conformity to the objective reality -- the conceptions of "flexible reaction" and "special troops" which he recommended as an effective means in the combat against the world-wide system of socialism and the widespread revolutionary movement on the continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Bourgeois military theoreticians who call themselves adherents of dialectics do not understand and ignore the essence, the nucleus of dialectics: the teaching of the unity and the struggle of opposites as a source of self-propulsion and development in nature and society, including military affairs. Refusal to acknowledge that the struggle of internal opposites is the source of development is linked primarily with their fear of acknowledging the role of class antagonisms in capitalist society and in the bourgeois armies. A dialectic from which, on the basis of class reasons, its essence has been discarded is an idealistic dialectic and it cannot be a scientific methodology although bourgeois military theoreticians do rely in their research and conclusions upon individual elements of that dialectic.

A few bourgeois theoreticians acknowledge that the decisive influence upon changing the methods of armed combat is exerted not by the "free will" of the military commanders, but by the development of the material means of conducting the war. Undoubtedly this is an

element of the materialistic explanation of armed combat. But this materialism of theirs is inconsistent and limited, metaphysical and not infrequently vulgar, and incapable of rising to a materialistic explanation of the socio-political aspect of armed combat.

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From positions of elemental materialism and inconsistent dialectics, bourgeois military theoreticians view such phenomena as the influence of the development of weapons and combat technology upon the means of their application, many questions of tactics, maintenance, and the methodology of combat training for personnel, the organization of troop control, combined operations of combat arms and of branches of the armed forces, and other questions of a military-technical nature. The more or less correct solution of these questions is based upon the publicizing of the past experience of wars, as a rule, between homogeneous bourgeois states and armies. When the new situation does not correspond to that which was encountered in past experience, bourgeois military theory either attempts metaphysically to adapt to the new conditions the laws, conclusions, and principles formulated on the basis of past experience, or rolls over to the side of subjectivism, voluntarism, and agnosticism.

In wars against the Soviet state there was an especially brilliant manifestation of the limitation of bourgeois military science, its inability to reveal the dependence of armed combat upon the nature of warfare, the political goals and tasks, social structure, interrelations between the people and the army, etc. Bourgeois military theoreticians evaluate the socialist social system and its army from metaphysical positions, that is, from positions of those natural laws, qualities, and internal antagonisms which are inherent in the capitalist social system. They cannot understand the specific natural laws governing armed combat between states and armies of different social systems.

It is well known that absolutely all the bourgeois military theoreticians predicted the defeat of the Soviet state and its armed forces in a combat against the imperialistic interventionists and the domestic counterrevolution. Moreover, even after our victory in those wars, bourgeois military science still was unable to understand correctly the decisive reasons for the victory of the Soviet nation and its armed forces. British, French, and other bourgeois military historians explain the reasons for the defeat of Hitlerite Germany in terms of the rainy autumn and freezing winter of 1941-1942, Lend-Lease Aid to the Soviet Union, British and American bombings of German territory, etc. This pluralism is characteristic of the metaphysical method of thinking, when there is no understanding of the dialectics of the necessary and the accidental, the essential and nonessential links, essence and phenomenon, cause and effect. The incorrect evaluation of the reasons for our victory is also explained by the fact that the correct treatment

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and truly scientific substantiation of the reasons for the victory of the Soviet state and its armed forces over the strong bourgeois armies unmasks the very system of capitalism, which is incapable of opposing the new progressive social system that socialism and communism is.

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The famous British theoretician General Fuller, as far back as 1962, stated in the article "Berlin Problem" that the partisan movement against the German-fascist usurpers could have been avoided if Hitler had raised, instead of the swastika, the flags of the bourgeois Ukrainian, Belorussian, and other nationalists. Without desiring to understand the essence and nature of socialist patriotism and the proletarian internationalism of Soviet citizens as one of the sources of the victory of the Soviet nation in the Great Patriotic War, Fuller advanced his own new victory plan to be used by the NATO countries against the Soviet Union, using "subversive warfare," inasmuch as, he admits, it is impossible to be victorious over the Soviet Union in atomic warfare.

The bourgeois theoreticians are also extremely far from a scientific understanding of the matter when they analyze the economic conditions of the victory of the Soviet Union. In a book written by former Hitlerite generals and several leaders of the wartime economy and entitled Results of the Second World War there are several articles with an analysis of the wartime economy during the Second World War. But none of them contains even a hint of the most important thing: the opposite nature of the production relations in the Soviet Union and in Hitlerite Germany, the decisive advantage that the socialist wartime economy had over the capitalist. American Professor Klaus Knorr analyzes the wartime economy and the outcome of the Second World War from the same metaphysical and vulgar-materialistic positions. In his book, War Potential of Nations, the class position of the imperialist theoretician has taken the upper hand over common sense. It is difficult to believe that K. Knorr actually failed to understand the tremendous supremacy in combat spirit that the Soviet troops had over the soldiers of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht, and the supremacy of Soviet military art over Hitlerite. Or to believe that this eminent expert on military economics "did not notice" the obvious advantages that the socialist production relations have over the capitalist production relations in the achieving of the economic and military victory of the USSR over Hitlerite Germany. Knorr states that "the outcome of the war was decided not by supremacy in combat spirit, military art, or the qualities of old or new weapons, but by the advantage in military production which proved to be on the side of the United Nations" /retranslated from Russian/ and that, in warfare, "the deciding role of the quantity of human and material resources was the consequence of the development of industrial production and machine technology" /See Note/. And that is not all: Knorr openly rejects all that manifests the tremendous advantages

of the socialist social system and its successes, and consciously states that the sole factor of military might and victory in warfare is supremacy "in industrial production," only because it is profitable to him from the class point of view, since capitalism, according to the level of industrial production, still has advantages over the world-wide system of socialism.

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[Note]: Klaus Knorr, Voyennyy potentsial gosudarstv [translation of: War Potential of Nations], Voenizdat, 1960, page 68.

Social development during the present-day era is proceeding, in accordance with natural laws, along the path of the victory of socialism over capitalism. The ideologists and theoreticians of imperialism simply cannot recognize this objective, natural phenomenon. The doom of the bourgeois system is inevitably leading to the intensification of mysticism, irrationalism, and agnosticism in bourgeois philosophy and sociology, and bourgeois military theoreticians are proving incapable of understanding the sources of the military might of the socialist state and its armed forces. The lack of understanding of objective natural laws governing social development, and the lack of desire to admit the lack of scientific substantiation for their military ideology are leading bourgeois theoreticians to scepticism, irrationalism, and agnosticism in military theory.

Of course, in military science irrationalism and agnosticism cannot be expressed in the same open form as in bourgeois philosophy and sociology. No one will attempt to take into consideration a theoretician who denies the possibility of the cognition of military affairs. Therefore it is possible and necessary to speak only about elements of irrationalism and agnosticism in bourgeois military science. For example, one of the ideologists and participants in the development of the "Blitzkrieg" plan -- former chief of the Hitler General Staff Heinz Guderian -- justified himself, by the use of hindsight, by saying, "The outcome of any combat actions, as a rule, and in Russia in particular, cannot be planned in advance" [See Note].

[Note]: Itogi vtoroy mirovoy voyny [Results of the Second World War], Publishing House of Foreign Literature, 1957, page 133.

But wherever laws are ignored and wherever, consequently, it is impossible to rely on theoretical thought, that is when a possible way out is allegedly provided by intuition, which is understood by bourgeois military theoreticians idealistically, as a supernatural "inspiration" inherent only in special people who are granted this ability from "higher revelation," that is, from God. The intuitivistic trend in military theory is one of the sharply expressed forms of idealism. It is well known that the German-fascist military theory was officially and consistently constructed on the acknowledgment of the supernatural intuition

of Hitler and the military and political leaders. The reverse side of the same kind of idealism is the tenet, which currently is very widespread in bourgeois military theory, that the sole reason for the defeat of fascist Germany lay in Hitler's incompetency and miscalculations in military and political management. Certain military theoreticians attempt even to "legalize" intuition as one of the fundamentals of military science. For example, General-Colonel (Retired) L. Rendulich states that "even in the past war a large role in the acquisition of the correct views concerning the basic paths of the further evolution of the war was played by intuition" [See Note].

[Note]: O sovremennykh operatsiyakh [Modern Operations]. Collection of translated articles, Voenizdat, 1962, page 47.

The idealistic essence of "intuitivism" consists in the acknowledgment of the "divine revelation," and the "mystical aura" which are allegedly bestowed on individual personalities at birth.

The bourgeois military theoreticians who are adherents of "intuitivism" feel that war and armed struggle do not have any objective natural laws governing them, and therefore the management of combat actions of the troops cannot, in their opinion, be constructed on a scientific basis and does not lend itself to scientific explanation. Only person who presumably are imbued with that supernatural "aura" are capable of finding the decision which leads to victory and which is inaccessible for "ordinary" people.

The voluntaristic idealistic theory of intuitivism has its social basis. In the intuition of the military leaders, dictators, and presidents the imperialists attempt to find a force capable of turning back social development and of saving the capitalism which is doomed by history [See Note].

[Note]: The mystical explanation of intuition is directly antithetical to the scientific, dialectical-materialistic understanding of intuition as the ability of people, under definite conditions, without any well-founded substantiation or reasoning, to evaluate a situation and to make the correct decision on the basis of a large amount of practical experience, knowledge of the objective natural laws governing armed combat, and a thorough study of the enemy.

By failing to acknowledge the dialectical-materialistic theory of cognition and by ignoring it, bourgeois military science accepted pragmatic gnosiology as standard equipment. This theory of cognition justifies eclecticism and sophistry in the theory of cognition, and justifies treachery and deceit in practical activity. An example of the pragmatic approach to the solution of problems of military theories is an article written by British Air Marshal D. Slessor and published

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late in 1964. The article begins with the statement, "Personally I have always felt that direct military aggression is incompatible with the basic political line of the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime obviously has at its disposal other means permitting it to inflict defeat upon us without, by so doing, threatening those tremendous successes which were achieved by the Soviet nation" /retranslated from Russian/. But this statement does not correspond to the military policy of imperialism or the interests of the military monopolies and the military men. Therefore Marshal Slessor, completely without proof, advances the thesis that the present-day size of the imperialist "armed forces in Europe does not correspond to our actual needs."

This sophistic method was also used by the former commander in chief of the United States Strategic Air Command, General Thomas S. Power, in an interview published in the magazine U. S. News and World Report on 25 January 1965. He is strongly in favor of the development of nuclear weapons and the carrying out of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, despite his very own statement that "attempting to resolve the differences of opinion or to achieve any goals by means of a war with nuclear rockets means the greatest stupidity that one could imagine" /retranslated/.

The pragmatic, subjective-idealistic interpretation of the laws which are allegedly the product of the human consciousness and exist in the consciousness of people also finds its reflection in bourgeois military theories. D. O. Smith, for example, confuses objective laws and principles, metaphysically views the "eternal nature" of principles. "... The law of concentration of superior forces and means at the necessary time in the decisive sector is just as invariable as Newton's law of action and counteraction" /retranslated/ /See Note/. Hence the correctness of the principles and conceptions are determined by Smith not by checking to see whether they conform to objective laws, but on the basis of the feature of "general acceptance," "general validity," and the conformity to the interests and ideas of people.

[Note]: D. O. Smit /Smith/, Voyennaya doctrina SShA /United States Military Doctrine/, Publishing House of Foreign Literature, 1956, page 13.

Inasmuch as bourgeois military science is not and cannot be a consistent scientific theory, there frequently occurs in the military affairs of imperialist states a break between theory and practice, between the views of military theoreticians and the official views.

Of course, even in bourgeois military science there are many principles which reflect the objective natural laws governing modern armed combat. It is necessary to conduct a thorough, critical analysis of the imperialist military theories, to know how to differentiate between the efficient in them and the antiscientific and one-sided.

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"Everyone will agree," V. I. Lenin wrote, "that it is unintelligent and even criminal if an army does not prepare to master all the types of weapons, all the means and methods of combat which the enemy has or might have" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 41, page 81).

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An absolute necessity for the successful unmasking of the reactionary features of bourgeois military theory and a critical analysis of that which is efficient in it is the dialectical-materialistic analysis of its philosophical and methodological foundations. The solution of this task is also necessary in order to achieve a better understanding of the scientific nature, the tremendous importance, and the advantages of Soviet military science.

CONSOLIDATING A GAIN IN AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION

Maj-Gen V. Reznichenko and Col Ye. Bob

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Every offensive operation has its limits as to depth and duration, determined by the missions and the material and psychological capabilities of the troops. To accomplish and complete the defeat of a large group of the enemy with one blow is possible only if he is weak or unprepared.

Analysis of the experience of past wars shows that the main factors resulting in lowering the tempo of offensive operations and in pauses in them, and consequently in the necessity of consolidating a gain achieved, were active counter-action by the enemy and a constant lowering of the combat capabilities of the attacking forces as they advanced in depth in the enemy's territory. The latter is caused by increasing losses of equipment, weapons and personnel, by psychological and physical exhaustion of troops, stretching out of lines of communication, a marked decrease in mobile reserves, lagging of supply bases behind the attacking troops, and slowness in restoration of roads.

Under modern conditions, losses of troops, especially from nuclear weapons, will incomparably increase, and continuous supply to troops will often be disrupted. At the same time the depth of the attack will greatly increase. As to the activeness and strength of counter-action by the defending enemy, they have a tendency constantly to increase. This is because of the increase of the nuclear weapons which can be allotted to the defensive operation, the increase in depth of the defense, and the number of highly mobile reserves of various composition and purpose.

The defenders, possessing powerful and long-range nuclear missiles and tank and air assault troops, will strive for sudden and decisive counter-action against the attackers, inflicting nuclear and air attacks on groups of the latter which have broken through, carrying out powerful counter-thrusts and counterattacks, and disorganizing the offensive forces' operational rear and communications. They will try in every way to break up the offensive and sometimes even go over to a counteroffensive. And troops which have not taken promptly effective measures to consolidate a gain may quickly lose it and find themselves in a difficult situation.

Thus timely and effective consolidation of a gain is essential to the successful development of an offensive, an inescapable necessity in carrying out offensive operations.

There are those of the opinion that consolidation of a gain is an incidental measure, to be carried out in certain critical stages of an offensive only for covering a flank or repulsing counterattacks of the enemy; that troops should consolidate a gain only after the achievement of the final goal of an offensive operation.

IN OUR opinion, consolidation of a gain is an integrated undertaking, planned and accomplished throughout the whole operation, with the aim of maximum preservation of the striking force and combat capabilities of the groups of the troops on the offensive, of timely and most effective frustration of all the countermeasures of the enemy, and of creating the most favorable conditions for further development of the offensive.

There is much in common between measures for developing a gain and consolidating it. Both have the final goal of assuring success of the offensive. It must be remembered that the best method of consolidating a gain is its swift and uninterrupted development, since this in itself removes many of the tasks of consolidating a gain and makes unnecessary some measures which were planned in advance. Besides, many tasks involved in consolidating a gain and in developing it have common methods of operation. Thus, combatting means of nuclear attack in the sectors of operation of offensive striking groups are carried out with the aim of developing a gain, but the accomplishment of these same measures in the sector of operations of counter-attacking groups of the enemy is already consolidation of a gain.

Consolidation of a gain is accomplished by specific methods of operation, such as protecting threatened flanks, repulsing counterattacks, destruction of armed groups of the enemy, combatting his landing forces (desanti), shifting part of the forces over to defense, protection and defense of important targets, etc.

Let us examine the content of the measures and the methods of operation in consolidating a gain in offensive operations. Some of them, practiced in the past war, such as combat with the enemy's reserves, repulse of his counterattacks, and protection of threatened flanks, will have to be carried out in modern operations, too, especially in operations without the use of nuclear weapons. But the conditions of nuclear warfare require fairly substantial modifications in them. Therefore an attempt is made in this article to reveal those features which will be characteristic of consolidation of a gain in the qualitatively new conditions.

The most important feature is that now the activity of the counteraction of the defending enemy and the depth of its destruction of the offensive troops has greatly increased. Essentially, it encompasses almost the whole depth of the operational formation of the two sides.

Therefore measures for consolidating a gain will require much more forces and means, and they will be carried out on a much wider scale. At the same time operations for consolidating a gain and parrying the thrusts of the enemy will take place in a dynamic, rapidly-changing situation, when making the necessary decisions and carrying them out must be done in extremely limited periods of time.

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Furthermore, while previously one of the main measures for consolidating a gain was combatting infantry reserves, now the primary task is combatting the enemy's means of nuclear attack. For this purpose, part of the nuclear ammunition and other means of destruction will be used against those nuclear forces of the enemy which he is using in the interests of preparing counter-attacks and launching (parachute drop) of landings (desanti), and which are aimed against troops of the offensive side assigned to parrying counter-measures of the enemy.

Nuclear weapons can very quickly and dependably rout approaching reserves intended for attacks on the flanks of the offensive forces, and can destroy the dangerous rocket units of the enemy and his air and sea landings. However, it must be borne in mind that the supplies of nuclear ammunition may be limited, and it must be used first of all for development of a gain in the main directions. Therefore a gain will often have to be consolidated by combined-arms forces and conventional weapons, with the use of only a small amount of nuclear weapons. In connection with this, sometimes part of the combined arms forces and artillery and special troops should be designated in advance for timely and successful countering of the counterattacks of the enemy.

Under modern conditions there has been a substantial change in the nature, content and methods of combatting the operational reserves of the enemy which, along with nuclear weapons, he will direct toward frustrating an offensive. During the past war, counterattacks by reserves in the main sectors were primarily repulsed by tank and motorized infantry troops with the support of air power, and, as a rule, from a position of close contact; the depth of fire action against the reserves was not great. Now the fight with these reserves has been shifted far into the depth of the enemy's defense and begins with preventive nuclear attack with missiles and air power long before their approach to the dispositions of the attacking forces. This means that disrupting the counterattack of the reserves, in other words, consolidation of a success, may take place in many cases without participation of large land forces. In addition, this mission may be accomplished in exceptionally short periods of time and thereby avoid operational pauses in the conduct of an operation. The main part of the forces, in essence, can be freed from combat with the reserves of the enemy. And this increases the capabilities of the striking force of the attacking troops in the development of an offensive.

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In a future war there may be used not only tactical, but also large-scale air and sea landings against the offensive forces. In this, as the experience of foreign armies shows, their landing and operations will be closely linked with the launching of counter-blows and the carrying out of counter-attacks. The existence of tactical nuclear weapons and a trend toward sudden, bold actions increases the danger of attacks launched by landings. Thus, timely destruction of the various landings is an active and very important measure in the consolidation of a gain.

To destroy large landings it will be necessary to use nuclear weapons, and bring into action forces from the second echelon and the reserves. Here the greatest results can be achieved if it is possible to accomplish this before the landing is able to assemble and begin to operate. It must be remembered that even small landings may be able to launch sudden and powerful blows against the flank and rear of the offensive forces. In coastal sectors, suitable for sea landings, it is expedient for part of the forces to be assigned to anti-landing defense, having second echelons and reserves ready to move.

It should be kept in mind that powerful air attacks will most often be one of the first measures of the enemy against the offensive forces. Therefore timely creation of a reliable air defense must be considered as a necessary condition for consolidation of a gain throughout the whole operation. To accomplish this, it is necessary already during the planning of an operation to think out carefully the procedure for shifting anti-aircraft missile units, rebasing of fighter planes, and their maneuver for the purpose of timely strengthening of the system of air-defense in the sectors threatened. In the course of an operation it is necessary to strive to shift air defense missile troops and to create new groups of them in such a way as to organize a constantly dependable zonal cover for the troops, especially in the area of the main attack and in those sectors where counterattacks of the enemy are developing.

In offensive operations of the past a very characteristic feature of consolidating a gain was protection of threatened flanks. Under modern conditions, troops will encounter this problem still more often, since the flanks in advance by sectors (po napravleniyam) will be more vulnerable because of being greatly extended.

Protection of such flanks by dense covering detachments of tanks, infantry and anti-tank weapons, such as used to be used, is now impossible, since it would require an unjustifiedly large allotment of forces. Obviously this mission will be accomplished by separate forces at the most-threatened sectors, and by maneuver in these sectors of tanks and anti-tank units, the fire of tactical and operational missiles, long-range rocket artillery, and air strikes. The sharply

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increased mobility of counter-attacking forces will require timely measures for protection of the flanks, since the slightest delay will result in the enemy penetrating the dispositions of the offensive forces. As a result the development of the operation may be brought to a halt, and localization of the breach of the flank will require far more forces and time.

One of the possible methods of consolidating a gain even under modern conditions will be shifting of part of the attacking forces to the defense. It is very important to determine correctly the most favorable moment for this, for doing it too soon or too late may result in equally unfavorable consequences.

Shifting over to the defensive, it seems, is necessary when there are not enough forces to break up the counterattack of the enemy. To determine the most suitable moment for shifting to the defensive requires effective reconnaissance, ability correctly to discover the plans of the enemy, and swiftness and decisiveness of action.

The defense will be set up not completely, but in the sectors of the most probable attacks of the enemy. In the gaps between these sectors there may be planned blows by nuclear weapons, artillery (especially rocket artillery), and aviation; obstacles will have to be set up by mobile methods. The depth of the defense, as compared with the past war as a whole, may be somewhat less, since the operational disposition usually will be single-echelon. But a feature of it will be the existence of highly mobile reserves. The success of such a defense will greatly depend on the ability to determine ahead of time the most favorable directions, regions and boundaries of the defense, and to organize the fire system and use of weapons and equipment so as to inflict, with forestalling fire attacks, maximum destruction on the approaching forces of the enemy at the greatest possible distance from the line of defense.

Under modern conditions, consolidation of a gain upon forcing water barriers must be accomplished in a different way. In crossing the water barrier it is necessary to achieve ceaseless movement of the troops forward. There is required mobile means of expanding the tactical bridgehead into an operational one without any pause. Such actions are the best guarantee not only of developing the gain, but of consolidating it. No delay, or concentration of troops in small bridgeheads is permissible, since this creates for the defense more favorable conditions for the use of atomic weapons and elimination of the bridgehead.

Armed and cut-off groups of the enemy may remain in the rear of the advancing forces. Combat against them also will be one of the important tasks in consolidation of a gain. It is necessary to take into consideration that surrounded groups of the enemy may be extensively

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supported by rocket units. Their active operations in the rear of the attacking forces can result in the most undesirable consequences. Under certain conditions they may destroy the nuclear missile weapons of the attacking forces, strike blows at important targets of the operational rear, disrupt regular supply to troops of the first echelon, draw off against themselves part of the reserves and forces of the second echelon, and slow down the speed of development of the offensive as a whole in certain sectors. Consequently, for the sake of consolidating a gain it is necessary that the surrounded forces of the enemy, or those which have broken out of encirclement, be destroyed as quickly and surely as possible. For this nuclear weapons and tank and motorized infantry may be used.

In the system of measures for consolidation of a gain, of great importance is the defense and protection of operational objectives (ob'yekty) of the attacking troops from the actions of landing forces and sabotage (diversionnyye) detachments and groups of the enemy. How important this is is shown by the fact that in the US army the development of special forces is being accelerated; their number in recent years has increased eight-fold. It should also be taken into account that it is planned to include certain units of regular troops, especially paratroopers, in sabotage (diversionnoye) activity. In the opinion of foreign military specialists, diversionnaya warfare will no longer be limited to spontaneous, unrehearsed actions. Special warfare, including diversionnyye aspects, is being transformed from its previous occasional tactical support of local operations into a strategic activity.

In the zone of the front, to a shallow depth, troops of the first echelons and their reserves will have to be used to combat these diversionnyye landing forces and detachments. Deep in the rear this mission can be carried out by units moving up to the front as replacements, and also by those being moved back to be brought up to strength, and for rest. It must not be forgotten that success in combatting these detachments, whose targets will be mainly nuclear missile weapons and major headquarters and installations of the rear, largely depends on the timely receipt of information and swiftness of action of the forces designated for this mission.

One of the most important and constant measures, without which it is impossible to accomplish dependably the tasks of consolidating a gain, is the timely augmentation and restoration of routes of transport and evacuation. War has shown that losing sight of this may be enough for an achieved gain to be lost. Thus, one of the principle reasons for the unsuccessful offensive of the Southwest Front in the Donbass in February 1943 was the extremely slow restoration of the railroads. As a result the supply bases lagged behind, and the mobile reserves of the troops were reduced to 0.5 - 0.75 of fuel and 0.3 - 0.5 of ammunition

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supply. The troops of the German army, limited as to materiel, could not effectively withstand the counterattacking forces of the Germans.

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A modern offensive operation requires a still greater expenditure of materiel than formerly, while the conditions for its transport in a nuclear war will be exceptionally difficult. As a result of massive nuclear strikes by the defense, great destruction on lines of communication, creation of vast zones of radioactive contamination, and destruction and flooding are inevitable. Foreign military specialists even recommend the creation of special nuclear barriers and nuclear mine fields in order not only to block the timely arrival of operational reserves, but also the bringing up of nuclear missile and ordinary ammunition, fuel, and provisions. Railroads are especially vulnerable. In addition, in the West they are paying great attention to the organization of all possible sabotage actions (diversiya) against communications and are actively preparing special forces for this, attaching great importance to their technical equipment.

All this demands very much attention to the organization of uninterrupted supply of the troops, without which consolidation of an achieved gain will be impossible. In order to cope with this task, it is necessary to involve in it all kinds of transport and efficient use of repair and restoration agencies. During an operation, along with railway and motor transport, it is necessary to utilize the capabilities of pipe-line and, especially, air transport. With the offensive forces moving out into the depth of the enemy territory, on account of stretching out of the lines of communication and activation of the enemy's sabotage (diversionnoye) activity, there will inevitably be necessary a great many measures for strengthening the protection of the lines of communication.

Analysis of the questions raised by us shows that this problem under modern conditions becomes especially difficult and acute. The conditions of conducting offensive operations in depth in a nuclear war are such that the total amount and relative importance of measures for consolidating a gain are steadily increasing, while the time in which they can be carried out is decreasing. This makes the work of commanders, staffs and troops much more difficult. Now many measures can be carried out in the course of an operation only if they have been carefully planned ahead of time on the basis of foresight as to the probably counter-actions of the enemy. At the same time, a great many measures will have to be worked out precisely in the course of the operation; some will have to be abandoned, other outlined and carried out. Thus the work of commanders and staffs in the consolidation of a gain in an offensive operation must be regarded as a constant creative process, inseparably involving deep analysis of the activity of the enemy and the course of the development of the whole operation.

RADIOELECTRONICS AND INTELLIGENCE-0
Maj-Gen Engr-Tech Serv A. Matveyev

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With the greatly increased range of action and power of modern armament, there has arisen the very serious problem of making intelligence equipment completely correspond to the combat characteristics of weapons. In this, radioelectronic gear is of special importance. Therefore we shall dwell only on those problems which have to do with the use of radioelectronics in the interests of intelligence, basing our article on data published in open Soviet and foreign publications.

Let us examine some of the principles which determine the role, under modern conditions, of technical equipment as used in the missions of strategic and operational intelligence. The latter can be divided into two major groups: first, the collection of information providing for the launching of attacks against the enemy (offensive operations), and, second, getting data for the repulse of enemy attacks (defensive operations).

The conditions of combat operations make different demands on the intelligence facilities which comprise these groups. For those which serve offensive operations there are usually set forth fairly clear missions, determined by the plan of the operation and the composition and armament of the forces which are to carry it out. In this case intelligence is required to discover targets of the enemy which are subject to destruction during the operation, the composition and disposition of his forces, and their armament. Thus intelligence for offensive operations is interested primarily in targets of the enemy and his capability to repulse attacks -- his defensive capability. When intelligence is to serve repulsing enemy attacks it has somewhat different missions. In this case principal attention is paid to the enemy's means of attack -- their characteristics, disposition, and plans for their use.

Despite the essential difference of the missions of the above two groups of intelligence facilities, they are united by the conditions of their use. In both cases intelligence must operate against objectives located in the territory of the enemy, and at great depth, corresponding to the range of the means of fire-power.

Time is a very important factor in intelligence, in many cases playing a decisive role, especially for the group serving the defense. The flight of ballistic missiles lasts only a short time. During that time the fact of their launching must be ascertained, the possible areas where they will land be determined, and measures taken to protect personnel and equipment. With the flight velocities which have been achieved, to prepare to repulse the attack even of airplanes, the

off is discovered. In these conditions rapid action by intelligence is of unquestionably decisive importance.

Speaking of the revolution in the military field brought about by the development of missiles and nuclear weapons, it must be kept in mind that it has equally affected the means of intelligence, without which the most perfect weapon may prove to be useless.

Under the new conditions there has been rapid increase of the importance of the technical equipment of intelligence, extensively applied in various fields of intelligence activity: the acquisition of data, transmission of it to collection centers, processing and analysis of intelligence data received from various sources, and, finally, putting the generalized data into a systematic form, convenient for use. In all these steps there is the most extensive use of radioelectronic gear, by means of which the facilities collecting data and those transmitting, analyzing, and processing it are united. Thus modern instruments of intelligence must be regarded as a single complex, consisting of receivers (datchiki) of information (which used to be considered the characteristic means of intelligence), means of transmitting the data obtained, and equipment for its processing.

The application of radioelectronics in technical equipment for discovering and identifying objectives in enemy territory has been brought about by great successes in the exact sciences, especially physics. We live in a world of fields and radiations, caused by the movement of material particles. It is through these fields -- electromagnetic, gravitational, acoustic, and others -- that the interaction of material bodies with the surrounding environment and with other bodies takes place.

Electromagnetic radiation is not the only characteristic of an object which distinguishes it from surrounding objects. In many cases other fields may be used for this purpose -- acoustic, magnetic, gravitational -- and in some cases use of these fields gives results which cannot be obtained by radioelectronic means. We may give as an example hydro-acoustic instruments, operating in water, in which electromagnetic waves are propagated with great absorption.

The use of the magnetic wave has made it possible to develop mine detectors, which discover metal objects under the ground, something which so far it has not been possible to accomplish by other means. There are great prospects for use of the gravitational field, but so far there are no methods known for detecting the weak gravitational waves with the movement of physical bodies.

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The use of electromagnetic radiations has certain limitations, determined mainly by the conditions of propagation of radio waves of the selected frequency range. Waves shorter than 10-12 m are propagated in a straight line, undergoing no reflection in the atmosphere. Therefore the range of operation of radio equipment in this frequency band is limited by line-of-sight, and for reconnaissance in enemy territory it must be mounted on appropriate carriers: airplanes or artificial earth satellites.

Thus the means of reconnaissance intended for direct acquisition of information on targets and forces of the enemy are inseparably connected with the vehicles which carry them, and success of reconnaissance is determined by the capability of the vehicle to surmount the enemy's defense. From this point of view the role of radioelectronic gear in the acquisition of intelligence is growing beyond measure, in so far as aircraft and spacecraft are being provided with the most varied radio engineering equipment.

Some radioelectronic gear used in intelligence is well known, and there is no need to examine it in detail. We have in mind apparatus for the detection and interception of electromagnetic radiation (radio- and radio-engineering intelligence), radar stations for various purposes, television equipment, etc. As far as these are concerned, we will limit ourselves to considering some prospects for their development. Initially we will touch on the new demands on this equipment brought about by scientific and technical progress in armament. This has to do primarily with increase of range of operation and of accuracy of determining the coordinates of intelligence targets. Suffice it to say that the relative accuracy of determining the coordinates of targets for intercontinental ballistic missiles amounts to 10^{-4} - $5 \cdot 10^{-5}$, which corresponds to the micron accuracy of machining parts on the most highly-developed lathes. Such high relative accuracy of measuring coordinates requires search for new methods of fixing [the location of] carriers of the reconnaissance instruments, i.e., the development of much improved methods of navigation. It should be taken into account that such high accuracy of measurement has required the correction of maps, especially in making more precise the triangulation system of various continents, inasmuch as the methods of geodetic measurements used previously could not provide the required accuracy. We know that major work in this field is going on abroad, directed, particularly, at the development of geodetic satellites (the American Secor and Anna, for example) and navigation satellites (Transit), and at the compilation of accurate maps of the sea bottom for the method of geophysical coordinates (sovmeshcheniya) in sea theaters of operation. There has been a substantial increase in the accuracy of radio navigation and inertial navigation. These systems make it possible to fix the location of an aircraft or a ship within 150-200 meters at various distances.

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In the light of the above considerations, let us dwell on some of the more concrete fields of the use of radioelectronic devices for the purposes of intelligence.

Electromagnetic radiation intelligence. Along with the traditional use of such means for interception and finding the direction of radio transmissions, they have come into extensive use for intelligence on radar stations, navigational systems, and other special-purpose radio engineering installations, particularly for determining the characteristics, composition and disposition of air defense (PVO) installations. This arises from the principles of construction of modern PVO, which are saturated with radar stations for the long-range detection of air targets and the guidance of ground-to-air missiles and fighter planes, and with communications and command radio stations. Improvement of intelligence equipment for this purpose has been in the direction of extending the range of frequencies, increasing the sensitivity of receivers and the speed of action and automation of the operations of recording and analyzing signals received, and a higher general engineering quality of the apparatus, increasing its reliability and decreasing its weight, size and power-supply needs by the use of semi-conductors of modular and micromodular design.

Along with this there have appeared new fields for the application of apparatus for electromagnetic radiation intelligence, in which should be included, for example, the detection of nuclear blasts and even the launching of ballistic missiles. The tremendous energy released in a nuclear blast, the high temperatures and great volumes of products of decay, and the effect of these factors on the atmosphere, causes a number of phenomena, including powerful electromagnetic radiation, which can be detected and located as to direction from great distances. It has been reported in the press that a device for receiving the electromagnetic impulse radiated by a nuclear blast is included in the system, established on US territory, for the detection of blasts, which is being developed at the present time under the "Nudets" program.

Characteristic radiation and other side phenomena caused by the operation of a rocket motor has served as the basis of a method of detecting the launching of ballistic missiles which is being worked out by the Americans under project "Red Mill." In the operation of powerful rocket engines there occurs characteristic radiation of the column of ionized gases created by the flame of the engine and the effect of the products of combustion on the ionosphere, which produce distinctive vibrations which radiate to a great distance. Utilization of these phenomena opens up the possibility of detecting missiles practically at the moment of their launching, which under modern conditions is of extremely great importance.

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A new direction in the development of electronic radiation intelligence apparatus is the development of space equipment for this purpose. Despite the secrecy in the US of the work on space reconnaissance, information has been published in the press about "Ferret," a radio reconnaissance version of the Samos satellite reconnaissance system. To estimate the capabilities of such an apparatus, one really does not have to have access to secret information, since its possible characteristics can be easily figured out. With broad-band and sufficiently sensitive apparatus, the space vehicles can detect PVO and PRO [anti-missile defense] radar stations at a distance of 1200-5000 km with a satellite height of orbit of, respectively, 100-1,000 km. Naturally, at such a distance, and with the enormous amount of radio installations on the ground, the problem arises of overloading the reconnaissance receivers; this problem, however, considering the level of development of electronic computing and data storage, can be solved successfully.

Radar intelligence. Radar has been used for the accomplishment of the most varied missions, beginning with the detection of targets on the battlefield and in the air and meteorological reconnaissance, and ending with the detection of IIR's and objects in space. Radar continues to be the reconnaissance basis of the modern PVO and PRO system.

There was a time when some specialists expressed the opinion that the possibilities of radar had been exhausted, and there could scarcely be expected any further progress in this field in the future. This opinion was based on the fact that the power of radar transmitters had reached a limit, and there did not seem to be any practical realizable way to increase the sensitivity of receivers. The susceptibility of radar stations to jamming played a considerable part in this pessimistic evaluation of the future prospects of radar.

Despite such predictions, radar has continued to develop at a fairly rapid rate. A number of scientific discoveries and technical improvements have made it possible to develop new models of radar with substantially improved tactical and technical features. The problem of increasing the power of transmitters was solved by the so-called phased antenna arrays, in which the power of several transmitters is combined in the required field of space. The solution of this problem became possible as a result of the development of electric vacuum oscillators with very high stability and electronic frequency control. The number of such transmitters arranged in a planar array can be very great (up to several thousand in one installation), and their total power is practically unlimited. Phased antenna arrays have also made it possible to solve the problem of electronic beam control and to increase substantially the traffic capacity of the radar station, inasmuch as shifting of the beam to a given point of space requires only millionths of a second.

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the use of special devices (for example, parametric amplifiers), the sensitivity of radar receivers has been substantially increased and has approached fairly close to the theoretical limit, determined by the level of noises generated in the antenna. Methods of processing signals have been improved, the capabilities of radar stations to identify targets have been substantially expanded, and their interference-killing features have been improved. All of this has made it possible to come close to the solution of the most important problems of PVO -- the detection of low-flying targets. Here it must be remembered that one of the main limitations of radar -- range of operation within the limits of optical sight -- remains in effect, and increasing the range of detection of low-flying targets so far is sought by raising the radar on airplanes or helicopters.

Since 1950 work has been carried on in the US on developing radar stations capable of detecting targets beyond the horizon (Projects "Teepee" and "Madre"). In speeches of the US Secretary of Defense during the past two years it has been stated that some progress has been made in developing such stations, and they are being constructed at the present time. The stations operate on a band of short waves, propagated to great distances by reflection from the ionosphere. The reflection of waves of this frequency range from the earth, and the phenomenon of back scatter, makes it possible to get a return signal characteristic of the scatter of radio waves by certain sections of the earth's surface. Deviation of these characteristics from the normal can serve as an indication of the presence in this region of moving objects or other causes of change in the nature of the wave scatter. It should be noted that work in this field has already been going on for 15 years. The great fluctuations in the state of the ionosphere make it scarcely possible to develop a reliable apparatus of this kind. However, the very disturbance of the state of the ionosphere may serve as a sign of the launching of very powerful ballistic missiles. Therefore it is no accident that beyond-the-horizon radiolocation is linked with the American project "Red Mill," in which are being investigated all possible means of detecting the launching of ballistic missiles, including, for example, the use of ultra-low-frequency acoustic vibrations.

One of the achievements in the field of radar reconnaissance is the development of airborne reconnaissance stations with lateral scanning, in which are used antennas with artificially created (synthesized) aperture. For a long time the use of airborne radar reconnaissance sets was limited by their inadequate resolution capability, caused by the small size of their antennas. This was partly overcome by the development of antennas along the length of the plane's fuselage and providing scanning on both sides of the planes line of flight.

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However, the physical aperture of the antenna did not provide the required resolution. Then the method of lateral scanning was perfected by the application of the principle of synthesizing large antennas apertures by using the movement of the aircraft and by special processing of "packages" of signals emitted during a certain interval of time, comparatively, weakly by a directional antenna. Use of this method makes it possible to get effective antenna apertures of the order of tens of meters.

The method of synthesized antennas makes it possible to obtain clear radar charts of terrain, on which, after decoding, may be detected objects with dimensions of a few meters.

In foreign countries much attention is being paid to investigation of the possibility of using radar stations for reconnaissance from an earth satellite. Apparently the problem of creating such a station has not yet been solved, mainly because of the great weight and size involved. However, work in this direction is continuing, and it is possible that the creation of space radar reconnaissance stations is not so far off.

The possibilities for use of radar for reconnaissance are not exhausted by what has been mentioned above. Work has been done, and is going on, on the development of special-purpose radar -- meteorological, cartographic, etc. Deserving of special attention is the development of radar for reconnaissance of terrain -- the condition and traversability of ground, the nature of vegetation cover, etc. (Electronics, 28 December 1962, p 20). In these studies there are being investigated the characteristics of reflection and absorption of radar signals by the ground in various sections of the frequency range, on the basis of which it is contemplated that it will be possible to judge as to the condition of the soil to a depth of 40 cm.

One of the fields of development of radar technology is so-called passive radiolocation, in which objects' own radiation is used. The basis of this apparatus is a very sensitive receiver with an antenna having highly-directional reception, by means of which sequence scanning of the terrain is carried out. In view of the difference of temperature and reflection capability of various objects there is created radar contrast, by which it is possible to detect objects of interest. To a great extent this apparatus is similar to the means of thermal reconnaissance, with the difference that it uses a millimeter and centimeter wave range.

Television reconnaissance has been known for a fairly long time. In recent years it has undergone substantial changes. A great achievement in this field is the development of very sensitive electronic-optical devices which make possible the detection of objects under conditions of natural night illumination, when no other means of observation can be used.

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Radio engineering has had a very important place in photo-television means of reconnaissance, combining the high resolution capability of optics with the possibility of immediate transmission of the pictures to the ground, with a considerable decrease in the need for radio-link transmission of data in comparison with purely television apparatus. In these systems the aerial photograph is automatically developed on board the aircrafts and transmitted to the ground by the television system, which has low frame frequency, making it possible to use a relatively narrow-band radio link (radioliniya). The importance of using such systems is due to the great vulnerability of the reconnaissance apparatus carrier to the enemy's means of defense and the necessity of immediate transmission of the data obtained to the ground collection centers.

Infrared equipment is finding ever-increasing use for reconnaissance. Based on the reception of electromagnetic radiations in the infrared range (0.76-500 micron waves), they are most often used in a passive system, for the reception of heated objects' own radiations. From this point of view, infrared devices can give best results in the observation of objects having motors or other power installations. Of no less interest is the use of infrared for the observation of objects having relatively slight contrast with the surrounding environment. Actually such means have been used for the detection of submerged submarines, by the difference in temperature of the wake stream compared to that of the undisturbed water, amounting to tenths of a degree.

Infrared, too, like other means of reconnaissance, has certain limitations, due mainly to the high absorption of infrared rays in fog, clouds, and rain, and the insufficiently high sensitivity of receivers, which is several orders lower than that of radio engineering means. The latter fact leads to the necessity of using methods of cooling the infrared ray detectors to very low temperatures, which greatly complicates the apparatus.

Along with passive infrared devices, the artificial illumination of a target by a source of infrared radiation is being used. Great impetus to the development of active infrared systems was given by the development of optical quantum generators (lasers), which have made it possible to use many methods of radiolaction in the infrared wave range. Lasers have made it possible to shift from incoherent infrared radiation of heated bodies, made up of a wide spectrum of frequencies, to radiation at specific (opredelennyye) frequencies (coherent radiation), which has the properties of monochromatic radiation in the radio-wave range. Besides the possibility of concentrating such radiation into very narrow beams, making it possible to get extremely high resolution in the observation of objects, lasers can be used for the transmission of the most varied information by the aid of proper

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Abstract. Laser telemeters of very high accuracy have already been developed, but their use in the atmosphere is so far limited to short distances (Electronic News, 9 April 1963, p 19).

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It must be borne in mind that the technology of coherent infrared radiation is in the beginning stage of its development, and at present it is difficult to name the concrete fields in which it is applied, but there is no doubt that this a very promising field, and one which may open the way to the development of new technical means of reconnaissance.

Consideration of the use of infrared techniques for reconnaissance purposes would be incomplete if we did not mention the possibility of using them for reconnaissance from space. There has been wide publicity in the US about the development of the Midas satellite, intended for the detection of the launching of ballistic missiles by the infrared radiation of the exhaust flames of their engines. It is known that this work has been complicated by the need for dependable selection of these radiations against a background of radiations from other sources, because of which the work has been reoriented in the direction of scientific research. Nevertheless, the solution of this problem is possible in principle, and putting the system into practice will be determined by its reliability of operation and cost.

In general it should be emphasized that the possibilities of using infrared radiations for intelligence have by no means been exhausted, and there are great prospects for development in this field. Research is going on also on the use of new sections of the wave range of electromagnetic radiations, particularly in the range of ultraviolet and even X-ray radiation.

This brief survey of the capabilities of radioelectronic and other means of detecting objects by no means encompasses all the fields of their use. However, all these possibilities are only potential. Most electronic means of reconnaissance have a range limited by line-of-sight. In using them there arises the unpleasant necessity of mounting them on carriers to bring them close enough to the enemy targets for detection to be possible. This has two main consequences: first, reconnaissance operations have to be planned as carefully as any military operations, and second, the aircraft -- the bearers of the means of reconnaissance -- must be provided with a certain minimum means of defense.

In the near future reconnaissance missions in operational depth will be accomplished mainly by piloted and pilotless airplanes. From this point of view the problems of organizing and carrying out reconnaissance have much in common with the combat use of aviation. It would be naive to think that the reconnaissance plane could operate in conditions where combat planes could not. Just like the combat

planes will encounter the enemy's strong anti-aircraft defense, which against solitary reconnaissance planes will be considerably more effective than against massed attacks of combat planes. The problem of support of the combat operations of reconnaissance aviation (these operations, essentially, should be considered combat ones) is attracting much attention from military specialists.

It is significant that in foreign countries in recent years there has been increased work on the development of reconnaissance-attack planes, which can carry out reconnaissance, and also attacks on individual targets. Among such planes is the multi-purpose F-111, developed in the US, the strategic attack-reconnaissance plane, SR-71, and others. The problem of protecting the operations of such planes is being met by shortening the time of their stay in the area of active air defense, by flight at low altitude, or by increasing their speed at high altitudes. It is known that these planes are equipped with means of jamming the radio engineering equipment of the air defense.

In foreign countries another way of providing air reconnaissance, mainly in tactical depth, is the development of pilotless reconnaissance planes, an example of which is the American type AN/USD. In this case it is believed that even if this relatively cheap plane should be shot down, it will still have been able to receive and transmit to ground points important reconnaissance data.

The transmission of reconnaissance data is the field in which radio-electronics is of specially great importance. So far the only means of communication with moving means of reconnaissance is radio communication, with all its inherent virtues and defects. Use of radio communication in reconnaissance imposes no special demands on it when its traffic capacity corresponds to the amount of information to be transmitted. The latter circumstance is always important and is difficult to achieve for short-wave radio links of long range communications, inasmuch as increasing the resolution of the reconnaissance apparatus results in a marked increase in the amount of information received. We know that the amount of information increases as the square of the increase of resolution of the reconnaissance apparatus. Increase in the amount of information to be transmitted by radio links involves expanding the frequency range used by them. The creation of such links is possible only in the ultrashort wave range, the communication range of which is limited by line of sight. The solution of this contradictory problem -- combining high traffic capacity of the radio link with long range -- presents serious difficulty; the solution is being sought in the direction of establishing relay points, on planes or earth satellites.

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Means of communication are used in intelligence not just for the receipt of information from mobile objects. They also play an extremely great role in other fields of intelligence activity. Without dependable communication there could be no thought of any intelligence activity. In particular, means of communication are one of the most important elements of the systems of automation of intelligence operations, on which we will dwell somewhat more in detail.

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The problem of automation in intelligence is just as acute as in many other staff activities. Information about the enemy has an exceptionally important place in the process of decision-making at all levels of command and in carrying out plans decided on. Therefore, timely processing of the enormous stream of intelligence data, coming in from the most varied sources, sometimes incomplete and contradictory, is a task of primary importance, and unless it is accomplished, the expenditure of great efforts to obtain intelligence information may turn out to be useless. This comes from the very essence of the intelligence process, in which the getting of information is only the first, although most important, stage. Next there must follow the stages of assembly, evaluation, analysis, generalization, and interpretation of this information, with appropriate systematization of it by fields and subjects of interest to specific agencies of the command.

The possibility of automating these stages of intelligence activity is due to the development of electronic computer technology and mathematical methods of describing various processes and phenomena. It must be said, however, that varying opinions are expressed on the matter of introducing automation into intelligence.

Many operations encountered in intelligence are capable of being automated. They include accumulation, storage and search of data by specific subjects; processing of materials requiring laborious calculations; and a number of other fields involving uniform, repetitive activities. The use of machines in these fields makes it possible to get in a short time objective information on the subjects of interest. For example, according to information published in the press, a new automated system of search of intelligence information being used in the office (apparat) of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the US Army produces the data in four-tenths of a second.

The automation of processing intelligence data for the accomplishment of specific tasks is giving good results. The following information, for example, is published in the press (Armed Forces Management, July, 1962): because of the introduction of an automated intelligence subsystem on the battlefield, linked up with the field artillery fire-control system, the expenditure of shells for the destruction of small targets, with a probability of 90 percent, was reduced from 25 to 2.

Possibly these methods are inaccurate, but it cannot be denied that the automation of reconnaissance of targets makes possible a substantial increase of the effectiveness of fire weapons.

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We have examined only some of the problems concerning the use of radioelectronics in the interests of intelligence. Of course, the problems of intelligence are not solved just by radioelectronic means. But it is perfectly obvious that further improvement of intelligence will proceed primarily on the basis of the most wide-spread application of radioelectronics, which is the connecting link uniting and organizing the work of the most varied elements making up the system of intelligence.

In direct acquisition of reconnaissance data, radioelectronic apparatus is one of the few means of detecting and identifying targets for weapons. In the accomplishment of this task, radioelectronic means to an ever-increasing degree are combining with the systems of weapons, and in many cases the boundary between means of reconnaissance and of fire power is being erased. This shows up especially clearly in air defense, where without target indication neither ground-to-air missiles nor fighter aircraft could be used. In other kinds of weapons this unity is not yet so obvious, as a result of which intelligence is still regarded as a means of combat support, and its capabilities are not always tied in with those of weapons. Apparently for these weapons, too, the problem of target indication is becoming as acute as for air defense, and it is possible that in the future, means of reconnaissance will become a part of the complex of weapons and of automated systems of command of troops.

It should be especially emphasized that the possibilities of radioelectronic means of reconnaissance are far from being exhausted, and prospects for their development are truly limitless. The general progress of radioelectronics assures the development of very compact, economical devices with self-supervising ('samokontrol') elements and primary processing of data on board. A problem already practically solved is that of developing self-adjusting equipment ('sredstva') making it possible to solve assigned problems with the use of logical elements applicable to the existing circumstances. Awaiting action is the use of the principles of bionics for the development of still more improved means of reconnaissance, the use of which will greatly increase the capabilities of combat equipment.

THE ZONE OF THE INTERIOR FROM RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION

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Col. B. Timofeyev

Uninterrupted operation of industry and transportation and of power supply and communications systems, and dependable functioning of the administration of the country during a war make possible the vital activities of the state and are the most important factors in the achievement of success in armed conflict.

Maintenance of the vital activities of the state in a modern war depends primarily on the level of protection afforded the population and installations of the zone of the interior (tyl strany) against weapons of mass destruction, and on the effectiveness of the protective measures.

Problems of this protection are set forth in this article with reference to only one of the important destructive factors of a nuclear blast -- radioactive contamination, assuming that other factors (the shock wave, light radiation, and penetrating radiation) may be subjects for separate consideration.

It is known that in case of massed nuclear attack on targets of the zone of the interior, along with tremendous destruction there will be radioactive contamination of extensive areas.

All armies now consider radioactive contamination an important factor of destruction which may destroy the productive activity of important industrial centers and economic regions, kill and injure great masses of people, paralyze the operation of transportation, disorganize administration, and make difficult the rescue and restoration operations after the nuclear attacks.

The zones of radioactive contamination, of course, may encompass very sizeable areas of the country. Thus, according to data of the Scientific Committee on Radiation Information of the US, with a 10-megaton ground blast the zone of radioactive contamination, with an irradiation dose of 450 roentgens in 48 hours (for unprotected people), will be 240 km downwind and 40 km across the wind. It is easy to imagine what would be the extent of contamination in case of a massed nuclear attack.

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The probability of contamination of large areas and the danger of destruction of the inhabitants makes necessary an extensive system of protective measures, directed at timely detection of radioactive contamination and maximum reduction of its destructive effect.

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In various countries measures are being studied which enable the majority of inhabitants to survive the short initial period of nuclear war and its relatively prolonged succeeding stage. Thus, according to data from study of various forms of nuclear attacks, carried out by US scientists, the number of people remaining alive after a massed attack with a system of protection from radioactive fallout would be about twice that it would be without such a system.

Obviously, preparations for protection of inhabitants and targets of the zone of the interior is a problem of paramount importance. The main problem is seeing to it that the system of protection does not lag behind the capabilities of the weapons of the probable enemy, and this requires constant improvement of the means of protection and methods by which they are organized.

Under conditions when vast areas and practically the whole population of the country is involved in the sphere of combat operations of a nuclear war, the system of protective measures cannot be a local matter. Now it has been converted into a nationwide system of measures and is on a strategic scale. This system is based on the broad capabilities of the state to accomplish the necessary protective measures.

In our country the development and improvement of the system of defense in general, and of anti-radiation protection in particular, are facilitated by a number of favorable conditions which have a decisive effect in determining the nature and methods of accomplishing protective measures. Thus, the planned development of the national economy, including the planning of housing and industrial construction, makes it possible to provide ahead of time for the rational location of structures, building of shelters in the case of new construction, and reconstruction of existing buildings and installations.

The vast area of the country facilitates the most suitable dispersal of industrial, transportation, communications, and power-supply targets to decrease their vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction. And this has a very favorable effect on the solution of the problem of dispersal and evacuation of the inhabitants of the major cities to relatively safe areas.

The socialist economic system makes possible utilization of its necessary elements for the organization of stable administration, from top to bottom, in carrying out protective measures. The vast possibilities of using the materials and equipment base in the interests protecting the population creates the main prerequisites for successful solution of the problem we are discussing.

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It must be noted that in these conditions, radioactivity is an important factor. The highly organized and disciplined nature of the Soviet people, their feeling of responsibility in the performance of their duty, combined with initiative and resourcefulness, gives to the system of protective measures a special patriotic character, which cannot fail to give exceptionally favorable results.

THE SPECIAL FEATURES OF FORMATION OF ZONES OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION AND OF THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS OF RADIATION, INVOLVING THE ABSENCE OF ANY VISIBLE SIGNS OF CONTAMINATION, UNEVENNESS OF DISTRIBUTION OF THE LEVEL OF RADIATION IN THE ZONES, AND GRADUAL APPEARANCE OF THE SIGNS OF INJURY, DETERMINE THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF ANTI-RADIATION PROTECTION.

THE SUCCESS OF ORGANIZATION OF THIS PROTECTION DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON THE STATE OF THE SYSTEM FOR WARNING THE INHABITANTS AND THE TARGET INSTALLATIONS OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE RADIOACTIVE CLOUD AND THE BEGINNING OF FALLOUT OF RADIOACTIVE MATTER. SINCE THE PROCESS OF FORMATION OF ZONES OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION PROCEEDS GRADUALLY, THERE WILL ALWAYS BE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME, WITHOUT ANY HARD AND FAST LIMITS, FOR WARNING INHABITANTS OF THE RADIATION DANGER. BECAUSE OF THIS, ALL THE NECESSARY PROTECTIVE MEASURES CAN BE TAKEN IN GOOD TIME, BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION, ESPECIALLY IN AREAS REMOTE FROM THE TARGETS OF NUCLEAR ATTACK.

WE HAVE IN MIND EARLY WARNING OF THE DANGER, MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF DATA FOR THE PREDICTION OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION, WITH THE WARNING TIME FOR DELIVERING THE NECESSARY COMMANDS AS TO THE DANGER DEPENDING ON THE RAPIDITY OF SPREAD OF THE RADIOACTIVE CLOUD AND THE DISTANCE FROM THE TARGET OF NUCLEAR ATTACK OF THE AREAS LOCATED IN THE THREATENED DIRECTION. SOME IDEA OF THE POSSIBLE PERIODS OF TIME FOR TAKING PREVENTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURES, FROM THE MOMENT OF NUCLEAR BLAST TO THE BEGINNING OF RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT, IS PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING TABLE.

POSSIBLE TIME (IN HOURS) FOR DELIVERY OF WARNING OF RADIATION DANGER.

| Average wind velocity (km/hours) | Distance of region from target of nuclear attack (km) | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | 20 | 30 | 50 | 75 | 100 | 150 |
| 25 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 6.0 |
| 50 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 3.0 |
| 75 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 2.0 |
| 100 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.5 |

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From the table it is apparent that with timely warning, the population will have enough time to take the necessary protective measures. Any delay in delivery of these warnings by the lines of communications will decrease the possibilities of protection from the effects of radioactive matter and may entail unjustified losses.

However, early warning does not solve all the problems of notifying the population. It only alerts the appropriate agencies as to the danger of contamination which will arrive within a certain time. There may be cases when the danger will pass by the warned region, since prediction of radioactive contamination does not always prove to be sufficiently accurate.

Here there arises the need of providing a local warning signal when there is immediate danger of contamination of a certain region. This can be accomplished by very simple sound means, with a network of points for instrumental checking for contamination. The primary task of such a network is determining the beginning of fallout in time.

Modern radiation reconnaissance instruments make it possible to detect the movement of the front of a radioactive cloud from five to ten minutes before its arrival at an instrumental observation point. Consequently the warning signal can be given in good time, before the beginning of fallout, which enables the population to take cover in time and put on protective clothing.

Thus constant readiness of an early warning system, and local warning of radiation danger, with a network of instrumental observation points, are the necessary prerequisites for effective protection from radioactive radiation.

Radiation shelters, capable primarily of weakening the effect of radioactive radiation, are of decisive importance in protecting the population from such radiation. Information is found in the foreign press which indicates the reduction of casualties depending on the nature and amount of protective measures taken in advance. Thus it has been calculated that in case of nuclear attacks on the 150 largest cities of the US, loss of life would be cut in half just by the use of radiation shelters and partial evacuation, and with shelters affording protection against the shock wave, losses would be cut to less than one-sixth.

Outside the zone of the effect of the shock wave, it may be assumed, use of radiation shelters might decrease casualties by tens of times. Hence the necessity of preparing and building such shelters. This problem should not be made too difficult or involve the expenditure of great amounts of money and labor; to a considerable extent it can be solved by discovering already existing shelter facilities.

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In the US, for example, it is proposed to make maximum use of existing buildings for protection against radioactive fallout. It is believed that in this way about 50 million people can be saved. In the US and Great Britain, a program is under way of surveying existing buildings and installations and selecting ones for protection against radioactive fallout.

The possibilities of using buildings and installations for such protection are very great. In principle all buildings and installations (sooruzheniya) are suitable for this purpose, all the way from simple farm structures to large capital constructions. An ordinary wooden house weakens radiation by two or three times, a multi-story stone house, by tens of times, and basements and simple shelters like covered slit trenches, by 40 or 50 times or more. Therefore determination ahead of time of the protective qualities of structures and assignment of people to shelters (in case the danger signal is given) will promote the most effective use of already existing possibilities of protecting the population and also expedient planning of measure to increase the number of protective installations.

In selecting one type or another of protective structure it is necessary to give strict consideration to the radiation attenuation factor. Naturally, one should not turn toward the use of structures with a low such factor, since in such a case losses of life under conditions of strong contamination will be unavoidable.

It is known that the degree of injury to people is in accord with the following reference data: with irradiation doses of up to 25 r, no injury is perceptible; with doses of 25-100 r there is slight injury; with 100-200 r, medium injury; and 200-400 r, serious injury. Irradiation doses of 400-800 r cause extremely serious injury.

When people are in a danger zone of radioactive contamination, it must be taken into account that the radiation attenuation factor (K) is different for different kinds of shelters. Thus, on open terrain, where the total dose of irradiation is 1000-1200 r, personnel in shelters with the factor K-2 will receive an irradiation dose of 500-600 r, and, respectively, with K-5, 200-240 r; K-10, 100-120 r; K-20, 50-60 r; K-30, 33-40 r; K-50, 20-24 r; and K-100, 10-12 r.

From comparison of the above data, it follows that in case of heavy contamination, injury to the population can only be avoided if shelters are used which have a factor meeting acceptable standards. This does not mean, of course, that people cannot be put in shelters having a lower radiation attenuation factor.

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Evacuation and dispersal of the inhabitants are effective means of protection. At the beginning of a nuclear war, preparation for and carrying out evacuation from large cities may be made difficult because of the formation of zones of radioactive contamination. Is it expedient to carry out evacuation in such cases?

Calculations of probable losses of people from a nuclear attack before evacuation and after it show that even with the existence of zones of radioactive contamination, evacuation can be a very effective measure of protection if it is carried out taking into account the special features arising from the conditions of the radiation situation. Chief among them are the following:

-- The directions and routes of evacuation are chosen with a view to using those least contaminated.

-- The time for beginning the evacuation is set in consideration of a decline in the level of radiation, in order to avoid over-irradiation of people at the points where they go aboard means of transportation and in the period of movement along the routes.

-- The points where they get off the means of transportation and the regions for relocation of the evacuated population are chosen as far as possible in consideration of the prevailing direction of the average wind and at such a distance from the probable targets of nuclear attack that, with a nuclear blast of the power assumed for a given target, they will not be in the danger zone of the path of the radioactive cloud.

-- The means of transportation for the evacuation should be fitted out to protect people from the fall of radioactive dust.

The need for all administrative agencies which organize and carry out protection of the population to be constantly aware of the radiation situation requires such a system of radiation reconnaissance (razvedka) as can provide exhaustive information on the radioactive contamination to all levels in the required length of time, regardless of the scale, degree and location of the contaminated regions.

Effective accomplishment of these tasks is based on the principle of integrated utilization of stationary radiation observation points, mobile land equipment, and aviation. The permanent geographical location of monitoring stations of cities, military-industrial installations, and regions already assumes the expediency of a stationary setup for radioactive contamination monitoring points. Such points do not require means of movement; as a result, with the use of relatively inexpensive devices there is achieved an economical system of radiation monitoring.

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A very important advantage of a stationary network of radiation monitoring is the possibility of continuous monitoring of contamination simultaneously in all the areas being checked, and of taking readings from the instruments at any time. This assures great and constant readiness of the system for operation.

Since the control of the stationary instrument and the scale of readings may appear on the panel of the operator, which is located in a prepared shelter, the net of stationary sensors permits the taking of measurements of any, even very high, levels of radiation, regardless of the fact that the monitoring point may be located in a zone of radioactive contamination.

Having stationary instruments at points where are located economic and military installations, which have telephone, telegraph and radio communications, assures dependable control of the reconnaissance system and timely transmittal of the measurement data.

Some shortcomings inherent in stationary disposition of contamination monitoring points (possible vulnerability of the network, difficulty of any extensive maneuver of the means of reconnaissance, etc.) are completely compensated for by including mobile land equipment and aviation in the system of radiation monitoring. And it is no accident that the development of a stationary network of radiation observation points is getting much attention abroad. In the US, for example, no less than 150,000 such points have been set up, equipped with specially selected and tested instruments for the detection of radioactive contamination of the air and the surface of the ground. In England about 1500 observation posts have been put into operation.

In the territory of the oblasts and republics of our country, radiation observation points can be set up on the basis of various institutions -- for example, in the rural areas, in village Soviets, in the central farmsteads of kolkhozes and sovkhoses, in police stations, equipment and repair stations, posts of the hydrometeorological network, etc. If the above institutions are taken as the basis for the creation of observation systems, then the density of radioactive-contamination instrument-monitoring points, providing they are supplied with dosimetric instruments and they are rationally distributed in the area to be monitored, will in the main accomplish the tasks of radiation reconnaissance imposed on the stationary network. Bringing in, in every way possible, mobile land equipment and the personnel and equipment of civil aviation for this work will make the system of radiation reconnaissance most effective.

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It is known that outside the zone of effect of the shock wave and light radiation, but in conditions of lengthy radioactive contamination, industrial enterprises, transportation and other institutions will retain their capability and continue to function if the lives and ability to work of the people serving the industrial process are maintained.

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Consequently the main task of protective measures, in the interests of assuring continued operation of industry, transportation, power-supply, communications, and administration, is to prevent loss of workers and employees from radioactive radiation. This in turn requires serious consideration of the problem of developing systems of operation in conditions of radioactive contamination and procedures for putting them into effect.

Unquestionably, the varied conditions of the radiation situation and the nature of production processes make it impossible to solve the problem of the probable methods of operation for all enterprises in the same way. The work routine of each enterprise in conditions of radioactive contamination provides the possibility of designating in advance a period of dangerous radiations for parts of the operation for certain intervals during which people will remain in places with various protection (shelters, working spaces, or outside of any cover), depending on the expected dose of irradiation.

The work routine depends on many factors, chief of which are the following: the expected dose of irradiation; the radiation attenuation factor of the work rooms; the possibility of shift work, and the number of shifts which can be set up from the number of workers and employees of the enterprise.

In all cases the work routine (rezhim) under conditions of radioactive contamination is determined in such a way that with rational utilization of the protective properties of the work rooms and an expedient procedure for changing shifts, taking into account the expected dose of irradiation, the workers and employees are secure against injuries which would put people out of action. If no possible ways of operating can achieve this, the production process must be temporarily suspended till such time as radiation drops to a safe level.

In plants with a continuous process, where stopping production would involve great difficulties and dangerous consequences, the protection of people directly serving the system of control of the operations is achieved by developing individual or group protection in the working areas.

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One of the most important measures of radiation protection is ~~setting up a check of the irradiation of the population in general,~~ and the workers of economic installations. It makes it possible fairly accurately to determine the degree to which people have been affected, estimate the probable losses, and, depending on this, decide as to the organization of medical service to the population, the procedure for further use of workers and employees, etc.

Monitoring the irradiation of people involves the solution of fairly difficult problems. First of all, measuring the actual doses of irradiation requires technical equipment (dosimeters). The enormous demand for these if there were to be a mass supply of them to the population would involve great economic expenditures. Therefore it is necessary to seek the most efficient and not too economically burdensome means and methods of monitoring. Here an expedient organization would be one of group monitoring of irradiation, with the use of relatively inexpensive instruments, available to the population.

In the group method of monitoring irradiation, the actual doses of irradiation received by a group of people who have all been together in the same place is checked by one or a few dosimeters. In this way the number of monitoring instruments required is greatly reduced.

In the group method of monitoring, the composition and number of groups of people are determined on the basis of where they live and the place and nature of their work; these groups are sort of primary control units. As the basis for assignment to groups there may be established some distinguishing mark -- that of their work for workers and employees (their shift, shop, brigade, etc.), and that of their place of residence for the rest of the population.

The organization of careful and timely noting of the results of human irradiation monitoring must be considered necessary at all levels of the system of anti-radiation defense.

As to individual means of protection, that is not a very difficult problem, and, in our opinion, there is no special need to deal with it here.

The aspects considered in this article show that protection of the population and installations of the zone of the interior under conditions of radioactive contamination is a fairly difficult and important problem, the successful solution of which will make it possible to save millions of lives and assure the uninterrupted operation of many enterprises of the national economy for the achievement of success in armed conflict.

THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(A Military Political Review)

CPYRGHT

Col I. Moskvín

Military operations in Vietnam are expanding.

This is evident from the renewal by the US on 31 January of the barbaric bombings of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), which had been halted on 24 December of last year. This so-called "peace initiative" was a diplomatic move to disorient world public opinion in preparation for a further expansion of aggression against the Vietnamese people. It was stated in the declaration by the Soviet government on 1 February 1966 that "if the US wanted to gain peace as they have stated, then is the renewal of bombings really the method to create an atmosphere favorable to a political settlement in Vietnam? No matter what the estimate of the US government was of the position of the DRV, there is no way to justify the new acts of aggression which defy the principles of international law and the elementary standards of human morality".

In turning a "French war" in Vietnam into an "American war", the ruling circles of the US did not give thought to its size and believed that it could be ended in a comparatively short time.

However the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were not able to properly estimate the strength of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and in particular the combat capabilities of the Army of Liberation, its high fighting spirit, the fervent support of the army on the part of the Vietnamese people and their burning hatred for neocolonialists.

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Therefore in spite of a passionate wish to "throw back", and then at least "contain communism", the Pentagon strategists did not manage to determine the direction of the main blow and to create an appropriate grouping capable, as they believed, to defeat the South Vietnamese patriots in short order.

The stages of "escalation" of American aggression in Vietnam are well known. Thus in 1950-1953 the US was limited to giving military assistance to the French colonialists. In 1954-1963 the Americans took on the Saigon regime as their responsibility and there began the stepped-up establishment of large numbers of puppet armed forces on the base of American military assistance. According to American calculations, these armed forces were to "bring order" to South Vietnam. This, however, did not take place.

Convinced of the worthlessness of these calculations, US aggressive circles ceased to mask their actions and in 1964 began open warfare against the Vietnamese people using regular armed forces.

On 5 August 1964 ships and planes of the Seventh Fleet brought the coastal regions of the DRV under fire. At the order of President Johnson, American planes since 7 February 1965 have regularly bombed the territory of the DRV. In March of this same year the first unit of US regular troops -- the 9th Marine Brigade -- landed in Danang. At a conference of leaders of the US Armed Forces in Honolulu on 19-20 April it was decided to considerably increase the numbers of American forces in South Vietnam and to strengthen air force and navy units operating in this area. On 24 March the US government declared Vietnam and adjoining waters to be an "area of combat operations" of American Armed Forces. On 8 July the American president decided to employ ground forces and marines in combat operations on land.

The number of American regular forces in South Vietnam in the second half of 1965 reached 165,000 men.

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With the creation of such a major grouping in South Vietnam the leaders of the US Armed Forces were faced with the acute question of organization of a control system over their forces and of coordination with the army of the puppet government. By the beginning of 1966 the number of American troops reached 200,000 men.

Figuring to gain victory through the puppet army armed and trained under the guidance of American instructors, the US command then organized in Saigon a large advisory apparatus [See Note 1] which was later transformed into a "command for giving military assistance to South Vietnam". Later there was established at the decision of the President the "Command of US Armed Forces in South Vietnam" [See Note 2] -- quite a large control organ.

[Note 1]: The number of American advisors reached 25,000 and the size of the puppet army reached a little over 100,000, i.e. there was one American advisor for every four soldiers of this army.

[Note 2]: It would be more correct to say in "South-east Asia", since it has control over American forces in Thailand and other areas adjacent to South Vietnam.

Within the command were established headquarters for ground forces, air force (the previously formed 2nd Air Division is carrying out the functions of air force headquarters) and a marine headquarters (3rd Marine Expeditionary Force). They in turn control the corresponding service of the armed forces. Also subordinate to the command are large groups of American military advisors which have control over all military activities of the Saigon regime.

For the direct control of sovedineniya and chasti in each Corps area (according to the breakdown of the puppet army command) there has been established an American operations command headquarters ([Note]: New York Times, December 26, 27, 1965) which controls combat operations of American troops and also organizes coordination with the puppets through its senior advisor to the staff of the South Vietnamese Corps.

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The following instance is characteristic. When in the middle of 1965 the Americans set up Command "Alfa" in the 2nd Corps area and tried to place their forces and the puppet forces under it, the officers of the latter categorically refused to carry out American orders. Such "conduct" by the "allies" was a complete surprise for the American generals and they were forced to immediately deactivate this command and establish ties with the Saigon forces through the senior advisor.

After carrying out the indicated organizational changes and establishing, according to American statements, a five-fold numerical superiority over the Army of Liberation, which lacked, as is well known, planes, ships and tanks, it was planned to begin a broad offensive over the whole territory of South Vietnam at the end of the monsoon season (October).

In the course of this offensive it was planned to cut the entire territory of South Vietnam into three isolated areas, to cut the patriotic forces off from the main rice-producing regions and to destroy the Army of Liberation in none. It was planned in particular to strike blows from the area of Qui Nhon and Saigon in the direction of the Laotian and Cambodian state borders respectively, relying on bases established in the coastal strip.

However the widely advertised attack failed. American military reviewer Baldwin, having visited the more active sector in the area of Pleiku where the 1st Airmobile Division is operating, stated that for victory in this area alone there was need for "at least one more such division." On 28 December 1965 the move of ~~anew~~ **new** division into this area was actually begun.

In preparing for the conduct of war in a different military-political environment and under varying conditions of geography, the American Command gave great significance to the search for a suitable organization of so-called *soyedineniya* and *chasti* and to their armament and tactics.

In the views of the American Command the so-called "airmobile forces" presently comprise such an organization, especially for operations in an unconfined theater of

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military operations. "The essence of the concept of use of airmobile forces," stresses American military literature, "is to ensure a more rapid, safe and economic shift of infantry to a sector where they can gain superiority over the enemy and can hold this sector ([Note]: The Journal of Armed Forces, (sic), 21 November 1964).

Tests of the establishment of such units in the US Army have been going on for over three years. At the beginning of 1963, for example, there was formed the experimental 11th Air Assault Division. In 1965 the organizational structure of this division was reviewed and in its place was formed the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The organization of this division has been somewhat simplified. It consists of a division headquarters, three airmobile battalions, divisional artillery (three 105-mm howitzer battalions, a helicopter fire support battalion and a battery of artillery fire-directing aircraft), reconnaissance battalion, communications battalion, combat engineer battalion, an aviation group (two battalions of light and one battalion of heavy helicopters and a general support company) and a division support command. The authorized strength is 15,787 and its overall weight is one third that of the infantry division. The division is fully air-transportable. C-130 and C-133 aircraft can be used to move it over great distances. Such a test was run when the advance party of the division -- 1000 men, 254 tons of equipment and nine helicopters -- was moved in the course of a week from its base at Fort Benning (USA) to South Vietnam. The main forces of the division were moved by sea ([Note]: Time, 22 October 1965).

It should be noted that one third of the division's combat elements in a theater of military operations can be lifted at one time by organic helicopters. This division is presently operating in one of the most important areas of South Vietnam -- the Central Highlands. At the end of November 1965 Minister of Defense McNamara visited the 1st Division. He took note of the "successful organization of the airmobile division" and stressed that "one more division of this type will be formed in the US".

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At the same time the American Command is testing the effectiveness of organization and armament of ordinary infantry and airborne divisions as well as marine divisions. It is known that combat operations in South Vietnam are being conducted by the 1st Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division, 173rd Independent Airborne Brigade and 3rd Marine Division.

The American Command placed special reliance on the wide use of the so-called special forces. It is known that the initiators of the creation of these diversionary formations were inclined to believe that the mass and skilled use of such podrazdeleniya in a war to crush a national liberation movement could be no less effective than the use of nuclear weapons in other theaters. Such a "high regard" for the effectiveness of operations of special forces is evidently explained by the fact that of the seven special forces groups in the US Armed Forces four are concentrated in such "hot spots", in the American point of view, as West Germany, Okinawa, the Suez Canal Zone and in South Vietnam ([Note]: ARMY lines, 3, 22 September 1965).

In South Vietnam in particular, the 5th Group was designated for joint operations with analogous podrazdeleniya of the puppet army in the mountains and jungles on the borders with the DRV, Laos and Cambodia, from the 17th Parallel in the north to the Gulf of Siam in the south.

In addition these podrazdeleniya were given the mission of penetrating inaccessible areas fully controlled by the National Liberation Front in order to conduct undermining work by means of diversions, appropriate cultivation of the populace, bribery of the local authorities etc.

A special forces group consists of detachments of three types -- "A", "B" and "C".

An "A" detachment numbers 12 men and is designated for assisting in the organization of Saigon special forces troops and the control (offering recommendations) of the combat operations of these troops. Such a detachment, in the views of American specialists, can control a South Vietnamese detachment numbering 300-600 men.

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The "B" detachment conducts the basic combat training of personnel detailed to serve in special forces of the puppet troops.

"C" detachments give administrative and material-technical support to "A" detachments. "B" and "C" detachments exist in each of the four army corps of the Saigon Army.

It should be noted that these forces have not yet had any success in South Vietnam.

Air diversionary forces were also created for the same purposes in the Tactical Air Command. They have the following tasks:

- dropping (landing) diversionary detachments in the enemy rear and their air supply;

- direct air support of combat operations of ground-based special forces;

- the isolation of individual areas controlled by the National Liberation Front troops from other areas which are capable of giving assistance to the patriotic forces;

- the conduct of harassing operations;

- air reconnaissance, chiefly of partisan bases and troop movements;

- propaganda, including radio broadcasts from the plane, dropping leaflets and "gifts" etc.

Air diversionary forces have mainly outmoded aircraft at their disposal: the B-26 light bomber, A-1E fighter, E-28 trainer, C-46 and C-47 transports and others.

American militarists are placing great hopes on aviation. It has become the main striking force of the interveners. There are in use in Vietnam around 600 aircraft of the tactical air force, 350 naval, 30 strategic (E-52) and 1300 helicopters. The tactical air force is used in South Vietnam and against the DRV, and the strategic -- only in South Vietnam.

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However the strikes by strategic aviation, as acknowledged by the Americans themselves, do not always achieve their goal, since they are frequently made against uncontrolled areas.

One success is achieved by the use of strategic aircraft for strikes against major bases of the South Vietnamese patriots. These strikes are considered effective when they are made against comparatively large troop units (regiment) for the purpose of dispersing them and disrupting attacks being prepared by the patriotic forces.

Because of a lack of air resistance American aircraft made raids using very simple tactics: bombing was conducted at medium altitudes without air cover and without using ECM.

Since the second half of 1968, when the American Air Force suffered substantial losses over the territory of DRV, its actions began to change. Bomber groups are covered by F-4s fighters, bombing is conducted from low altitudes and strong jamming is performed.

However for the direct support of combat operations of ground forces it is believed that suitable to employ armed helicopters on the strength of their viability and capability for conducting aimed fire from low altitudes while being located over the target a comparatively long time. Transport helicopters are acknowledged to be the best means for tactical mobile moves under conditions of no roads and the difficult theater of Southeast Asia.

Naval forces, especially the carrier strike groups of the Seventh Fleet, have been widely used in the war in Vietnam.

After the Korean War US carrier forces were used chiefly as a means for frightening "recalcitrant" countries, which in such instances could not offer the appropriate counter-force. Strike carriers immediately appeared off the shores of the Chinese People's Republic during the strained situation in the Taiwan Strait, in the waters of Cuba during the crisis in the Caribbean, off the shores of Southeast Asia when battles were going on in Laos and on the Indo-China border, and in other instances when the Americans unleashed their next provocation against the young countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

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First off the shores of Vietnam in August of 1964 were the strike carriers, which marked the occasion by the Tonkin Gulf crisis, well covered in the press. Since then there have been, as a rule, three carrier strike groups in waters immediately adjacent to Vietnam.

Ground attack and fighter-bomber aircraft from these carriers make barbaric raids on objectives in the DRV and against the NLF [National Front for the Liberation of Vietnam; National Liberation Front], and ships of other classes fire upon coastal objectives of the NLF. These operations in essence are conducted without sufficient opposition and usually end successfully. Evidently in connection with this, the American press more and more often prints laudatory references to the naval forces. "Now," states the well-known American reviewer Weston, "it is quite evident that the carriers which a year ago seemed to be in their decline are in the highest degree an effective weapon in the war in the waters of Southeast Asia. Operations in Vietnam have once again confirmed the need for new missile frigates and other ships which evidently the navy does not now have" ([Note]: New York Times, 4 October 1965).

In touching upon the tactics of combat operations, American writers conclude the necessity to employ small elements. Thus, in the journal Infantry ([Note]: Infantry, January-February, 1965) it is stated that the company is the basic tactical element for conducting an offensive in jungles. Inasmuch as these elements will frequently have to operate independently, the journal states, in order to achieve success in combat under such conditions the commanders of all echelons will have to have flexible thinking and rapid reactions against sudden danger, and the soldiers will have to be able to conduct close combat and move rapidly off the roads.

For troops conducting a defensive action it is recommended that in place of a perimeter guard as used under ordinary conditions they form patrols to organize ambushes and also well armed patrols which must operate day and night. It is believed best to place no less than half of the forces available to the commander in these patrols.

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Special attention is directed at organizing security on the march and in passes. Thorough reconnaissance is required in all forms of combat activity, in particular because patriotic forces widely employ ambushes and brief strikes against marching columns.

Air landings are made, as a rule, from helicopters after a heavy air preparation of the proposed landing zone. The strength of the landing force does not exceed a battalion, although it is considered best for it to be company size. The landing parties are moved to the target under cover of armed helicopters and other aircraft at altitudes unattainable for small arms (not lower than 600 meters).

After the landing the podrazdeleniya organize their security, comb the area and consolidate their positions, just as ordinary infantry elements do, and then a base camp is established in this area. The area occupied in this manner is turned over to puppet troops and the local administration. However experience has shown that as soon as American troops leave such an area the patriotic forces have immediately returned and eliminated the camp of the local forces. In this regard the American Command has now been forced to leave its troops in the camps and with them as a base point to make further sweeps of the adjacent terrain. In the American press such operations have received the name of "grease spot tactics". As is known, grease spots have a tendency to spread. Having turned South Vietnam into a "bloody test range", the American occupiers are conducting large-scale experiments in the use of weapons and combat equipment.

At the present time there has evidently still not been developed a unified opinion on the advantages of one type of weapon over another. In this regard the American press prints different and frequently contradictory statements. However one thing is clear: under the conditions of a difficult theater, where combat operations bear essentially a partisan nature, when there is no solid front and when there is a lack of a more or less substantial concentration of troops and objectives in the operational rear, the use of aircraft, large caliber artillery and heavy tanks does not give the results on which the Americans counted.

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According to the estimate of the American military press, heavy tanks cannot find wide application under conditions similar to those under which the war in Vietnam is being conducted. And, on the other hand, the M41 light tank, which has been acknowledged as obsolete, showed good operational qualities, a good cross-country capability and the needed maneuverability. The best effect is achieved by the armored reconnaissance vehicles and tracked M113 and M114 APCs.

Having encountered the firm defense of the patriotic forces, the American Command was forced to admit that the "American soldier places heavy dependence on fire support" ([Note]: New York Times, 26, 27 December 1965), and in October 1965 eight battalions of 105-, 175- and 203.2-mm self-propelled artillery pieces were moved to South Vietnam ([Note]: Los Angeles Times, 24 October 1965). In January 1966 the move of an independent tank battalion was begun.

The American Command also had to make substantial changes in the system of rear supply, in particular the locations of the supply bases.

As is known, with the advent of rocket-nuclear weapons the American Command has attempted to situate the largest supply bases as far as possible from the probable combat areas. In the Pacific Ocean, for example, it was believed that the safest area was the Hawaiian Islands and adjacent islands. However even the comparatively small-scale combat operations in Vietnam created unbelievable difficulties in the shipment of military cargoes. As strange as it may seem, the American Command came up against an insufficient number of naval transports.

In this regard the Commander of US Armed Forces in the Pacific, Admiral Sharp, stated the following: "The Subic Gulf in the Philippines, Okinawa, Japan and Guam are nearer to the Vietnamese war than Hawaii, and the supply bases located there are fulfilling a more important role in the support of operations than is Hawaii" ([Note]: New York Times, 21 October 1965).

In the second half of 1965 rear area commands were established in South Vietnam, Thailand and on Okinawa, evidently for the purpose of eliminating these difficulties. They previously were in Japan and South Korea.

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Americans had to do considerable work in preparing the territory of South Vietnam and Thailand. The most indicative fact characterizing the scope of work is the construction of a base at Cam Ranh, which will cost almost 100,000,000 dollars. Constructed here is a landing strip 3,300 meters long, nine fuel reservoirs with total capacity of 8,500 tons of liquid fuel, ammunition dumps, a T-shaped pier etc. A 100 meter floating dock was delivered here. On the whole, Cam Ranh will be able to store a 45-day reserve of equipment for all US forces located in Central Vietnam ([Note]: Time, 22 October 1965).

Thus the American Command, in unleashing a war against the Vietnamese people, has encountered a large number of difficulties. Characteristic in this regard is the evaluation by Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee D. Russel, who noted that in Vietnam there had been committed literally all military errors about which it is only written in textbooks. We, continued the Senator, have made our share of the errors. We believed, he stated, that we had specially trained troops who knew how to operate in a mobile partisan war until we ourselves took an active part in military operations in Vietnam. Now, concluded Russel, we must considerably improve training.

We should note the feverish activity of the American Command as it amends and reexamines in the course of combat operations many principles and traditions in military affairs which have already been formed and theoretically "proven". For study of the "Vietnamese experience" the US Defense Department created a number of commissions and committees with the task of broadly and thoroughly investigating literally every more or less significant episode of the war in Vietnam.

However by virtue of a class limitation the American neocolonialists will hardly learn a basic lesson from the war in Vietnam and understand that the time of the colonial take-overs is long past. It is this which explains their plans for further expanding aggression in Vietnam and their attempt to spread it to other areas of Southeast Asia.

The US imperialists will not succeed in breaking the will of the Vietnamese people and their resolve to stand up

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for freedom, independence and unity of their Motherland. There can be no doubt that the American aggression against Vietnam will suffer an inescapable defeat, since on the side of the Vietnamese people in their fight for national freedom is all of progressive mankind, and primarily the Soviet Union, which will now and in the future give necessary aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE US ARMY

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In the opinion of US military specialists the achievement of success in military operations depends to a considerable degree not only on the effectiveness of intelligence activities in obtaining information on important objectives, intentions and actions of the enemy, but also on the methods of conducting an active battle against his intelligence.

The American Command believes that under present day conditions when the employment of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction is unthinkable without accurate and timely intelligence information on the objectives against which the strikes are planned, the battle against enemy intelligence activities has taken on primary significance and has become an absolute must in troop operations under any situation. Moreover many foreign military theoreticians point out that the best way to combat enemy nuclear weapons is by destruction of his intelligence-gathering means or by limiting its effectiveness.

Counterintelligence activities in the US army are carried out in close coordination with the active conduct of intelligence work. An American specialist in military intelligence, I. Haymont, writes on this question: "...intelligence and counterintelligence activities are conducted simultaneously and are inseparable" ([Note]: Irving Haymont, Takticheskaya razvedka v sovremennoy voyne (Tactical Intelligence in Modern Warfare), Military Publishing House, 1963, page 81). It is therefore not by chance that in the American army, as in the majority of armies of other capitalist countries, these forms of activity are joined in the intelligence service.

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Counterintelligence activity, in the views of the US command, is directed toward disruption or neutralization of the enemy's active intelligence operations and toward concealing from him the operations of one's own forces, including deception of the enemy as to one's true intentions.

One of the most important tasks of counterintelligence is also the detection of attitudes among US troops which are undesirable for the aggressive circles of the US and a check of personnel reliability.

The organization and conduct of counterintelligence in the US Army is the responsibility of commanders and chiefs at all echelons. Direct responsibility for the planning and direction of all counterintelligence activities except for deception of the enemy is placed on the chief of the intelligence soyedineyiye (ob'yedineniye). The duties of the chief of intelligence also include supervision over the conduct of steps taken to detect "subversive" activity, no matter what form it may take.

The chief of intelligence has the authority to use any staff officers to fulfill these tasks and to use at his discretion the organic and attached military intelligence podrazdeleniya.

Various intelligence chast1 and podrazdeleniya may be attached to a US Field Army. It is usually given a military intelligence battalion. This battalion is intended to carry out intelligence and counterintelligence missions in the interests of the Field Army, and its podrazdeleniya are attached to Army Corps and Divisions and used for the same purposes according to the plan of these soyedineniya.

A military intelligence battalion includes a headquarters and headquarters company, corps and divisional military intelligence detachments, and three companies: intelligence processing company, military interpreter company and security service (counterintelligence) company, which comprises around 130 men. The battalion total is around 1500 men.

The number of corps and divisional detachments in the battalion depends on the number of corps and divisions which make up the field army. Corps and divisional detachments are constituted from the military intelligence battalion on the basis of one for every corps intelligence branch and division intelligence section. The remainder of the battalion

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complement is used in the intelligence branch and other staff sections of the army. The corps and divisional military intelligence detachments also include a security service (counterintelligence) section.

The specific purpose and content of counterintelligence activities depend primarily on the military echelon (chast, soyedineniye or ob'yedineniye) within which they are carried out.

Counterintelligence activities in the division have as a primary goal the battle with enemy intelligence activities directed at discovering important objectives. Here the main attention is devoted to ensuring the security of stores of nuclear weapons and means of delivering the nuclear weapon to the target. The most typical measures are: limiting access of enemy intelligence to military objectives; ensuring secrecy of conversations over radio communications; limiting troop movements; camouflage and secret occupation of launch (fire) positions; strengthened guard and defense of objectives; creation of dummy objectives.

Personnel of the counterintelligence service are not organic to the division, but these specialists are found in the security service (counterintelligence) section of the military intelligence detachment, which is usually attached to the division. When reinforcement of the counterintelligence function is necessary the field army or army corps can additionally attach personnel of the counterintelligence service to the division.

Counterintelligence activities in the army corps are basically the same as in the division. However a greater number of men and podrazdeleniya of the security service participate and they are conducted on a broader scale. In addition to ensuring the safety of stores of nuclear weapons and means of delivery of nuclear weapons to the target and of reducing the effectiveness of enemy intelligence at discovering key objectives, the corps very frequently executes missions connected with ensuring troop security, with organizing an intelligence activity among the civil populace in border areas and on means of transportation, and also with combatting enemy radio electronic intelligence means.

Most typical missions are combatting enemy intelligence, organizing checks of refugees and other civilians arriving from territory under enemy control, capturing individuals and objectives of interest to counterintelligence, limiting movement of the civil population, and guarding and camouflaging important objectives.

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Counterintelligence in operations ob"yedeniya (in the field army and in group of armies) is carried out in its full scope, including ensuring the security of troops, supervision over the civil population, the organization of counterintelligence activities in ports, border areas and on means of transportation, military censorship and special measures directed against enemy intelligence. It is believed that success in accomplishing the majority of these missions depends on the ability of personnel to keep military secrets, to be invulnerable to enemy intelligence, to properly camouflage, and to observe and report the results of one's observations.

TO combat enemy intelligence the US command intends to use the men and intelligence means of soyedineniya and chast'i of all combat arms and special forces, army aviation podrazdeleniya, radio, radiotechnical and radar intelligence means, the Army Security Agency, diversionary reconnaissance groups (detachments), airborne landing parties and military police podrazdeleniya.

In view of the variety and complexity of the forms of combatting enemy intelligence, success in it is directly dependent on the concentration of main efforts on the most important axes and objectives, and also on how well these tasks are coordinated by a single organ on the level of soyedineniye or ob"yedeniye.

The battle against enemy intelligence, as with any other troop activities, assumes above all the timely delivery of necessary information on groupings disposition and the probable nature of operations of his troops, and also on all aspects of his intelligence activities.

In the examined aspect counterintelligence in the US Army has the tasks of timely detection of enemy intentions on the use of his intelligence network, the methods of training of enemy intelligence podrazdeleniya, and the techniques and methods of their operations.

It is stressed in the press that without knowing the disposition of intelligence forces and means on one's territory it is difficult to effect their destruction. For suppression of enemy radioelectronic intelligence means by jamming it is considered necessary to have an initial data base on the performance characteristics of these means, the procedures and methods of their usage, and also enemy capabilities in protecting his radioelectronic means against jamming.

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Base active counterintelligence of enemy aerial surveillance is in direct dependence on the timeliness and accuracy of data obtained on his reconnaissance aircraft bases, the performance characteristics of his aircraft, their on-board reconnaissance gear, the degree of anti-jam capability of the radioelectronic equipment, and also the methods by which he conducts reconnaissance.

With the aim of prohibiting penetration or limiting the sphere of activity of enemy intelligence podrazdeleniya in troop dispositions or in important objectives it is considered necessary to determine the possible ways and methods of penetration by his intelligence organs and the nature of their operations.

Finally, deception of the enemy is unthinkable without information on his intelligence operations. This information, as stressed in the press, must include indications on how informed the enemy is, which tells about his troops, on how easily the enemy intelligence organs can be fed false information and how this circumstance can be used to one's benefit.

Counterintelligence activities are by their nature broken down into active and passive.

Active includes the suppression of enemy attempts directed toward obtaining necessary intelligence information about American troops, the purpose being to destroy (suppress) enemy intelligence forces and means in his territory and to suppress his activities on one's own territory.

Obtaining information about enemy intelligence activities is viewed by the American command as the initial step in combatting them. In addition military specialists stress that uncovering enemy intelligence means is only one side. Another no less important side is their destruction (suppression) or neutralization.

As pointed out in the military press, the destruction of enemy intelligence forces and means in his territory and the suppression of their activities on one's own territory has as its purpose to deny or reduce the opportunities for the enemy to conduct intelligence activities.

Destruction (suppression) of enemy intelligence forces and means (reconnaissance aircraft, radar stations and complexes, radio intelligence means, intelligence organs, observation posts etc.) in past wars by the American command was

basically carried out by air force operations, artillery and antiaircraft artillery fire, security forces, and also diversionary groups and detachments. For example, before the landing of American and British troops in Normandy in the summer of 1944 a special operation was conducted to destroy and suppress with air and sea strikes the reconnaissance aircraft of the German Wehrmacht, and also the radar stations (posts) for detecting air and moving surface (ground) targets.

One day before the landing German radar stations were subjected to intense bombings from the air and to bombardment by artillery, as a result of which up to 80% of the radars were destroyed. A total of over 500 tons of aerial bombs were dropped on the radar positions, and a large number of artillery rounds were expended.

For the destruction of intelligence forces and means at the present time the American command is planning to employ almost all existing means of warfare, including nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction. It is stressed here that a large part of the enemy intelligence forces and means are taken out of action together with those destroyed enemy forces (objectives) which they support and near which or with which they are deployed. It is recommended to destroy the remaining portion of intelligence forces and means by specially assigned means.

It is planned to use nuclear weapons to destroy such important intelligence objectives as airfields where reconnaissance aircraft are based, pilotless drone pads, intelligence chast1 (podrazdeleniya), and the most important radio-electronic intelligence complexes.

Security is as before considered one of the active methods of combatting enemy intelligence. It has the task of protecting troops and important objectives against penetration by enemy intelligence into their areas.

As pointed out in the foreign press, under present-day conditions security should be organized according to a completely different principle, which is: do not allow enemy intelligence access to important objectives at such a distance that it can establish their nature and, more important, their coordinates. In this regard it is acknowledged as necessary to establish security at a distance of 2-3 km and more on approaches to objectives. It is believed that in this case not only will the reconnaissance of the objective be hindered, but the destruction of the objective will be excluded.

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Podrazdeleniya from a company to a motorized rifle (tank) battalion can be assigned for protection and defense of operational-tactical rocket-nuclear means and other important objectives. The opinion is also expressed about the feasibility of reorganizing the security and defense of rear objectives. To ensure the security of these objectives it is considered necessary to assign not only security and defense podrazdeleniya (chasti), but also mobile podrazdeleniya for combatting enemy intelligence.

In the aims of economy of forces and means in organizing security, especially of objectives of low mobility, it is planned to make wide use of various technical means (radar, television and automatic signalling).

Steps to prevent the penetration of enemy intelligence organs into important areas or objectives are recommended to be carried out with the use of natural obstacles limiting routes of approach to them and forcing these organs to conduct reconnaissance only on certain axes.

The rear area command is responsible for security of objectives. An important part in the work of the rear area command is maintaining the secrecy about means of delivery of nuclear weapons, stores of nuclear warheads, supply depots, rear establishments and means of transportation and communications, and also guarding these military objectives against reconnaissance and diversions. By virtue of its enormous territorial responsibility, the ground forces rear area command in a theater of military operations plans the conduct of broad counterintelligence activities ([Note]: Irving Haymont, Takticheskaya razvedka v sovremennoy voyne (Tactical Intelligence in Modern Warfare), page 86).

These are the present views of the American command on the content of the chief active measures in the fight against enemy intelligence. A brief analysis of these views shows that the main content of the fight against intelligence activities is the destruction of enemy intelligence forces and means and the suppression of their activity according to scope of measures undertaken, numbers of forces and means used and the significance. This once again proves that in the American army there exists a close tie between intelligence and counterintelligence as obligatory factors in the day to day activities of troops under present conditions.

Along with active counterintelligence measures the US Army devotes considerable attention to so-called passive measures. These do not have as their purpose the destruction

of enemy intelligence forces and means, but provide for the accomplishment of a large number of operations directed at hindering or reducing their effectiveness. These include: the ability of all personnel of the armed forces to withstand enemy intelligence activities, safeguarding classified documents, ensuring secrecy of conversations over all communications means, radio silence, strict observance of the rules of concealed control of troops, control over the movement and maneuver of troops, maintaining order, military censorship and combatting enemy radioelectronic intelligence means. In addition they include such forms of combatting enemy intelligence as deception or leading him astray.

Among various ways of passively countering the enemy radioelectronic means the American military command devotes special attention to electronic countermeasures. This question has received very wide illumination in the pages of the military press. It is stressed that in modern warfare electronic countermeasures will have enormously greater significance than in World War II. While at that time means were created which chiefly countered radars, at present there has been developed and perfected apparatus for intelligence and for creating interference for systems of radio communications, radio and radiotechnical intelligence, radio navigation, radio remote control and infrared equipment.

The advantage of the means listed for countering enemy radioelectronic means is, as noted in the foreign press, that they can be used even in those instances where the precise location of enemy radioelectronic means is not known.

Measures for electronic countermeasures against intelligence means provide basically for a disruption of radio communications and of operation of radio, radiotechnical and radar intelligence means, navigation and tracking systems and also intelligence radio nets as a whole.

In the overall systems of electronic countermeasures one of the most important tasks in countering radioelectronic means in general is the suppression by jamming of enemy radioelectronic intelligence means, especially the radio nets used by intelligence activities.

Jamming allows setting up a situation where the radio electronic device, being fully in order, cannot distinguish the desired signals and thus ceases to be a source of information. According to the method and means of creating interference, jamming is broken into active and passive.

Active jamming is done with special noise transmitters. To make the jamming effective the transmitter is tuned to the working frequency of the target radioelectronic device (radar station etc.).

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The US Army has various types of jammers classed according to their purpose and method of operation. These sets can be mounted in aircraft, helicopters, missiles, ships, vehicles and even Earth satellites. There are also jammers for one-time operation. Such jammers are usually dropped in a certain area and over a comparatively long time can interfere with the work of radioelectronic means situated in the vicinity.

For the conduct of the "radio war" the US Army has Army Security Agency groups. Such a group is usually attached to a field army and is designed for conducting radio intelligence, supervision over the concealed control of their forces and electronic countermeasures to enemy signal means. As the basic means of electronic countermeasures the Group uses special electronic countermeasures teams.

In the USAF jamming is usually done by the air radiotechnical intelligence means. It is conducted by specially equipped aircraft for the purpose of detecting enemy radioelectronic means and jamming them. The objectives of air radiotechnical intelligence are means of communications and radio intelligence, radars, navigation systems, radio remote control systems and jamming means.

Organizationally the air radio technical intelligence means are placed in air groups comprising several squadrons.

The creation of passive interference is based on the phenomenon of secondary reflection or dispersion of electromagnetic waves by various reflecting surfaces. This form of interference can be set up only by those radioelectronic means which work on the principle of receiving reflected radio signals. Such means, as is known, are the radars.

One of the means of creating passive interference are half-wave reflectors (dipoles), which were widely used by the American and British air forces during the Second World War.

Means for deceiving the enemy play an important part in the system of combatting enemy intelligence. Their goal is to intentionally feed to the enemy false information with the simultaneous concealment of everything of interest to

his intelligence and in addition to force upon the enemy an incorrect impression regarding groupings, dispositions and intentions of one's own forces. It is believed that deceiving the enemy will to a considerable measure make easier the attainment of success in modern combat and in an operation. It is recommended to deceive the enemy in any situation ir- regardless of the scope and combat mission of the ob'yedineniye, soyedineniya or chast.

The main methods for conducting missions aimed at deception of the enemy are misinformation, display of false targets (mockups of rockets, NURS [neupravlyayemyy reaktivnyy snaryad; free rocket] and nuclear artillery, pneumatic tanks etc.), demonstrations, concealment of troops and rear objectives (camouflage), maintaining military secrets and a periodic shift in troop dispositions.

One of the main means of misinformation is radio deception. This consists of transmitting false information by radio, imitating radio electronic radiations, distortion of the true picture of operation of radio electronic means, and increasing the volume of their work on secondary axes while maintaining the normal volume on the main axis. Radio deception is usually performed in conjunction with other means of deceiving the enemy. These means include false troop movements, the display of false objectives, the dissemination of provocative rumors, the outfitting of false fortifications and dumps, the simulation of traffic on the road network, the activation of air reconnaissance on secondary axes, and false agent data.

It is believed that radio deception in conjunction with other means of deception is capable of giving the enemy an impression of a concentration of rocket-nuclear means and troops and the preparation for operations where in reality there are none.

During the preparations for the Normandy landing the Anglo-American Command, as is known, worked out a complex system of steps designed to mislead the fascist German Army Command. In this one of the most effective means of deception was radio deception ([Note]: E. I. Townsend, Risk -- klyuch voyskovoy razvedki (Risk -- The Key To Military Intelligence), Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1957, page 52.).

The Command of the US and England decided to make radio deception the chief means of keeping their strategic plans secret. By means of radio deception they succeeded in leading the German Command astray, indicating that the

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main forces of the US and England would land in the area of Paix de Calle. The deceived Commander of German forces in the West, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, at the beginning of the landing of Anglo-American troops in Normandy continued to hold the 17-division 15th Army in the area of Paix de Calle. When the fascist command realized their mistake it was too late to change the course of events.

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The display (creation) of false objectives for deceiving the enemy under present-day conditions is considered to be not so simple a task. False objectives, in the opinion of the American command, should not only have the outer characteristics, but should to some degree reflect their qualitative content. As an example, pneumatic or plastic mockups of operational-tactical rockets cannot be represented as real if they do not have the properties for reflecting electromagnetic waves, so that the appropriate enemy radio electronic devices cannot establish the fact of a false display of the object. Therefore dummy objectives should be prepared not only similar in exterior appearance, but they also should have a real similarity to real objectives in a number of other intelligence features.

It is believed necessary in creating dummy objectives and setting up demonstrations to consider the fact that they must not be disproven by any one of the enemy's intelligence means.

The significance has not been lost even at present of such a technique of misinformation as leaving behind a false combat document (combat orders, instructions, plans etc.). Here it is considered necessary that the originators of these documents not be aware of their false nature and that the security of such documents be set up on a par with that of other classified documents.

As before, a prominent place among the other deception measures is occupied by camouflage, which is designed to hide or eliminate revealing features of troops or genuine objectives.

Camouflage primarily provides for the use of natural masking properties of the terrain and the use of artificial covers of different types.

The use of natural masking properties of the terrain for hiding troops from ground observation is primarily achieved by disposing and moving chastl and soyedimoniya in blind spots formed by the relief, forest masses, and other

points or individual locations for the purpose of cam-
ouflaging from enemy air observation the troops (objectives)
should be disposed in forests, brush, ravines and other cover.

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An important condition in the battle with enemy in-
telligence is considered to be maintenance of a high state
of alertness by personnel. This quality should show up in
the ability of officers and men to detect and uncover enemy
intelligence of all types.

These are some facts on the scope, content and meth-
ods of counterintelligence activities carried out by all
ob'yedineniya, soyedineniya (chasti) and establishments of
the US Army in preparation for and conduct of any form of
combat operations. A thorough knowledge of and considera-
tion for these measures will allow our officers to more suc-
cessfully conduct intelligence activities in an operation
and a battle if the aggressor dares unleash a war.

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by Col A. STROKOV and Lt Col V. SEKISTOV

Many books have been written on the second front in Europe, dealing with the various aspects of this subject, either specifically, or in connection with the history of World War II as a whole. The military side of the second front has been covered in many textbooks on the history of the art of war. And it is not even possible to list all the articles on the second front published in various Soviet journals.

The appearance of a new book in which this subject is studied in systemized form cannot fail to attract the attention of the reader interested in the history of World War II.³ This book is a scholarly study, although it is published under a title reminding one of an adventure novel.

Differing from the author's previous work, published in 1960, in which the subject of research was the military events on the western front in 1944-1945, the new book deals with the events of another period -- 1941 - 1943. The presentation is also substantially different. While in the earlier book main attention was paid to the carrying on of the armed conflict by our former allies in the theater of military operations, the main content of the new book is a study of the method of decision by the allies of one of the most important problems of the war for the anti-Fascist coalition -- the establishment of a second front in Europe.

In the introduction to the book, V.M. KULISH has given a brief critical review of Soviet writing on the second front, noting the contributions of authors in the treatment of this subject. At the same time he points out the limited use by them of sources in the first decade following the war, 1946-1956. Thereafter, study of the political and diplomatic problems of opening the second front took place separately from the military problems, which hindered clarification of the complete picture of the interrelations of the policies and strategy of the US and Great Britain, and was an obstacle also to delving deeply into the serious incongruity between the war aims of the alliance as a whole and the selfish interests of the American and British ruling circles. Besides, in the works of some Soviet historians there are contradictory, mutually exclusive judgements as to the attitude of the US government to the war in Europe (p. 29).

In the opinion of V.M. KULISH, the facts and materials collected in the works of Soviet historians, and the conclusions arrived at by them, only prepared the ground for a complete study of the whole history of the struggle for the opening of a second front (. 29). In our opinion, the results achieved by Soviet historians were greater than this.

Examining the aims of the anti-Fascist war and the interests of British imperialism in 1941 (Chapter 1), the author notes that the aims of the pre-war policies of the governments of Great Britain, France, the US and other countries were determined by one thing -- to direct German-Fascist aggression to the east, and resolve the imperialist contradictions at the expense of the Soviet Union (p. 54).

How can it be explained that during World War II there was formed an anti-Fascist coalition of basically different social and economic systems? The answer is formulated by KULISH with the utmost clarity: "the common danger of enslavement, and the coincidence of military-political aims arising from this..." At the same time, as the book correctly notes, there was inherent in the coalition another tendency, determined by "the contradictions between the participants" (p. 59). This statement flows directly from the statement of Lenin: "War is a variegated, multiform, complicated thing" (Complete Collected Works, Vol. 49, p. 369).

The formation of the anti-Fascist coalition on the basis of common concrete interests did not eliminate the hostility of the ruling circles of the US and Britain to the Soviet Union. This side of their policies, notes the author, was carefully concealed, while it was essentially the determining factor in deciding the matter of the second front in Europe (p. 62).

In connection with this indisputable conclusion, never subject to any doubt, the author poses the question as to the real possibilities of opening a second front in Europe in 1941. The British government avoided decision of this question on the pretext of lacking manpower and equipment. But was this really the main reason? To this question, which is the main subject for the first chapter, KULISH provides an answer on the basis of analysis of the relationship of forces in the West existing in 1941. First of all he stresses that conditions for successful opening of a second front improved with the sharpening of the conflict between the USSR and Germany and the rise of the liberation movement of the peoples of the nations occupied by the Fascists (p. 131).

By 22 June 1941 Germany had prepared over 70 percent of all her ground forces for the sudden and treacherous attack on the Soviet Union. Forty-eight divisions remained in the West at that time (in France, Belgium and Holland); two German divisions were in North Africa, of which one was a tank division. On the day of Germany's attack on the USSR, in the same countries of western Europe there were still 38 divisions, 2 tank battalions, and, in addition, 8 divisions in reserve for transfer to the Soviet-German front. By documents in archives the author established that on the western front (in August 1941) there were still a tank division and two tank battalions. (p. 83).

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According to KULISH'S estimates, based on British sources, in the autumn of 1941 in the British Isles there were 40 completely combat-ready divisions (including 5 armored divisions), 4 armored brigades, 7 infantry brigades, and 20 separate battalions (p. 80). In a memorandum to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on 3 November 1941, Churchill noted the existence in the British Isles of two thousand tanks, and a little earlier -- 25 October -- he wrote to the British minister-resident in the Middle East that "the British air force is already stronger than that of Hitler..." (p. 79).

The author provides some comparative data on the production in Britain and Germany of planes, tanks, guns, mortars and shells in the period between 1940 and 1942, which are evidence of the substantial superiority of the British war industry.

To answer the question as to the actual possibilities of opening a second front in 1941, deeper analysis is required, particularly of the state of the British war economy in 1941.

In examining the Anglo-American strategy of coalition war, the war plans of the US and Britain, and the policy of promises and procrastination with regard to the second front in western Europe (Chapters 2 - 4), the author gives prominence to a detailed presentation of the disputes and discussions of the political and military leaders of the US and Britain. Unfortunately, the works of the author himself are overwhelmed by the numerous and wordy citations, and this makes the book difficult reading.

Of greatest interest in these chapters are the materials on the practical capabilities of US and Britain of opening a second front in Europe in 1942-1943. KULISH, in analyzing correctly and in detail the "strange alliance," to use the expression of bourgeois historians, comes to the conclusion that the anti-Fascist coalition "was formed in a comparatively short time, almost in half a year." The signature of 1 January 1942 of the declaration of the representatives of 26 states "completed the process of forming and formalizing the anti-Fascist coalition" (pp. 58, 135). It seems to us that the chronological limits must be extended by a half-year, since not until 26 May 1942, in London, was there signed the treaty of alliance between the USSR and Great Britain in the war against Fascist Germany and her associates in Europe, and in two weeks (on 11 June) there took place the signing of the Soviet-American agreement "on the principles applicable to mutual assistance in waging war against aggression." By these documents there was finally established the military alliance of the USSR, the US, and Britain. The process of forming the anti-Fascist coalition was completed."⁶

Bourgeois historians distort the true role of the members of the coalition in World War II. The American historian, John Snell, for

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example, would have us believe that "after 1941 the US became the leading power in the world anti-Fascist front." KULISH's substantiation of the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the formation of the anti-Fascist coalition can very convincingly be set up against the fabrication of Snell. To this it should be added that it precisely the Soviet Union that was, and continued to be to the end, the leading forces of the coalition, for the outcome of the whole World War II depended on the decisive victory of the Soviet armed forces.

On 11 June 1942 Roosevelt "made a public announcement that the second front would be opened at the end of 1942."⁸ The next day there was published a communique about the Soviet-Anglo-American negotiations, in which it was stated that "complete agreement has been reached as to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942." This solemn promise the governments of the US and Britain did not keep.

KULISH presents the interesting stenographic record of the Soviet-American negotiations in Washington on 30 May 1942, in which it is recorded that Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff, said frankly that the US had well-trained troops, ammunition, air power, and armored divisions, and that the only difficulty was that of transportation (p. 211).

The shortage of tonnage, particularly of specialized ships, was repeatedly advanced as the pretext for putting off the invasion of France in 1942, and at the same time the construction of these ships was deliberately delayed.

Maguir, the British historian, would have us believe that just the publication of this communique "made Hitler transfer troops from Germany to France."⁹ From the data presented in the book we are reviewing, one can easily be convinced that quite the opposite was true. By 16 June 1942 the number of German troops in western Europe had been reduced from 36 to 29 divisions (p. 214). Germany had about 80 percent of her ground forces on the Soviet-German front at that time. In just four months (November 1942-February 1943), from France alone, 9 of the most combat-ready divisions were transferred to the Soviet-German front, and altogether during that period, from France, Belgium, Holland and Germany taken together 27 divisions and one brigade were transferred (pp. 305-306).

Instead of fulfilling their solemn obligation to open a second front in Europe in 1942, the Anglo-American allies, on 8-12 November 1942, landed their troops in north and northwest Africa. Snell tries to convince us that this landing "brought the hour of victory nearer."¹⁰ In actuality, the landing of American and British troops in Algeria and Morocco pursued the aim of postponing the opening of a second front in Europe, in order thereby "to maintain the existence of the Soviet-German front as long as possible. . . and also to solve the problems of the Near East and the Mediterranean in the interests of monopolistic capital" (pp. 269-270).

And Snell does not conceal the latter aim. He writes that the 8 November landings were intended to force the evacuation of British and the US in the Mediterranean basin."¹¹

The forces and equipment of the allies, intended for invasion across the English Channel, were sent not to the British Isles, but to other, secondary theaters, and mainly to the Mediterranean. By 31 December 1942 the US had sent to overseas theaters of war 1,065,000 men, but there were only 172,000 Americans in the British Isles (p. 209).

In 1943 there were 10.5 million men in the armed forces of the US, and in those of Great Britain (without the colonies and dominions), over 3.8 million (p. 360). However, instead of the planned build-up of American forces in England to the amount of one million men by 1 April 1943, it was decided to send only 150,000 there (p. 276). By the end of February 1943 there were 107,000 Americans in the British Isles, and further reduction of the number of US troops in Britain resulted in the fact that by the end of summer, 1943, there remained there only one American division (p. 301).

By 1 June 1943 the total number of American and British troops in the Mediterranean theater increased to 520,000 men (9 divisions) and 4,087 planes (p. 345). The concentration of such large amounts of forces and equipment has been used by bourgeois historians (McElwee, for example) to consider the Mediterranean theater a real front. To support this thesis, they simply write, without taking the trouble to produce any evidence, that as a result of the taking of Sicily "the Germans were forced to remove part of their best divisions from the eastern front and transfer them for the defense of their lines in the Mediterranean basin."¹² In this case the documentary data provided in Kulish's book may be used against McElwee. In September and October 1943, the German command, as a result of losses of their picked troops in the battle at Kursk, transferred to the Soviet-German front 17 more divisions, of which 2 were from Italy, 6 from France, 1 from Yugoslavia, and the rest from Germany (p. 332).

Along with a clarification of the political aspects of problems of the second front in Europe, the book reveals a great deal about the working out of the political plans of the allies in the anti-Fascist coalition.

KULISH provides interesting information in citing an article by I. N. ZEMSKOV¹³ on the conversations of the Soviet ambassador in London, I.M. Mayskiy, with the British political leaders, Eden and Beaverbrook. In these talks there were the first references to the necessity of landing operations in northern France. But the development of strategic plans proceeded in a different direction. Churchill and the chiefs of staff concentrated all their attention on the Mediterranean theater.

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The book also notes that the strategic plans of the allies with the general principles of the joint Anglo-American strategy, already formulated back at the meetings of military representatives which took place from 29 January to 29 March 1941 (commonly called "ABC"). In the principles of the British draft of the joint strategic plan there was recognition that "the most important theater of military operations is the European theater, and here victory must be achieved first of all." However, the book notes -- and this is very important -- that carrying out of this task was made dependent on strengthening the colonial positions of Great Britain in the Near and Middle East (p. 94).

The US had her own plans in the Mediterranean basin and other areas of the world, dictated by American imperialistic interests: extending her positions in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean at the expense of fallen France and weakening England. These strategic aims of US military leadership were set forth in an appendix to the political "Program of Victory." By 14 May 1941 there was developed and approved an American war plan ("Rainbow-5") in which an offensive against Germany was not indicated as an immediate aim. "In this respect the American plans coincided with the British" (p. 97).

At the Atlantic conference of Roosevelt and Churchill (10-15 August 1941) it was confirmed that the general strategic concept outlined in the "ABC" meeting was correct. Further strategic planning was considered at the first Washington conference at the end of December 1941. Soviet representatives were not invited, because the US and British leaders "were avoiding coordinated operations in Europe of the armed forces of all the countries of the anti-Fascist coalition" (p. 113). From this it is easy to understand the nature of strategic planning in 1942-1943.

US and British military leaders were working out several plans for invasion across the English Channel, but for two years these plans remained just training exercises for the planning agencies.

The participants in the first Washington conference recognized that Germany was enemy No. 1, but winning the war was planned for 1943 or 1944. Therefore strategic planning was based on the idea of gradually tightening the ring around Germany. Beginning with Africa, it was planned to advance across the Mediterranean into Italy, and finally into Germany.

The author concludes his examination of the strategic planning of Britain in 1941 with the correct and never-disputed conclusion: "It may be considered as established that during the whole second half of 1941 the government and the military command did not even consider the mission of invading the continent of Europe with major British forces for the purpose of opening a second front" (p. 129).

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Kulsh, dwells also on the problem of the leadership of the Anglo-American armed forces in carrying out their joint operations. The solution by the allies of this problem is of great theoretical and practical interest. If a new world war should arise, it would be a war of two coalitions. At the conference in Washington there was formulated the principle of unity of command. The author correctly notes that this principle was a reflection of objective necessity, and undoubtedly was a favorable factor, but Anglo-American imperialist contradictions prevented it from being carried out completely. The book tells about the establishment at the first Washington conference of the Joint Council of Chiefs of Staff, composed of "the chiefs of the American and British staffs of the army, navy and air force," but since the British could not be constantly in Washington, they were represented by John Dill (p. 146).

A more precise outline of the strategic command of the armed forces was as follows: making up the Joint Staff of chiefs of staffs were, from the US, chief of staff of the army, Gen Marshall; chief of staff, and later simultaneously also commander-in-chief, of the air force, Gen Arnold; Chief of Naval Operations, Adm King, and later, Adm Stark; and from July 1942, chief of the personal staff of the President, Leahy. From Great Britain it was the British Joint Staff Mission, headed by John Dill (in addition to him there were three other high-ranking officers).¹⁴

The mission of the Joint Staff included working out problems of conducting the war and developing the military strategy of the two countries. The staff was subordinate to the political leadership, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. They both took a direct and very active part in the decision of all problems of waging the war.¹⁵ Practical operation of the apparatus of joint command began in March 1942. The whole world theater of war was divided into spheres of responsibility in accordance with the political interests of the US and Britain. The British sphere included Africa, the Middle East, India, and Southeast Asia. The American sphere was the western hemisphere and the area of the Pacific, with Australia and China. The responsibility was joint. In the course of the war the US was able to penetrate into the sphere of interest of Britain.¹⁶

The staffs of the operational and strategic commands in the theaters of military operations included both American and British officers.

A study of the experience of the operation of the allied staffs is of more than just historical interest. For example, one of their main difficulties proved to be the lack of a common military language. American and British officers spoke the same language, but it was unexpectedly discovered that different terms were used for identical concepts, which frequently lead to confusion and misunderstanding. It was necessary to compile a common dictionary.¹⁷

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With regard to the Anglo-American operations actually carried out in the Mediterranean basin in 1942-1943, the author, unfortunately, limits himself to just a chronological record of events. However, the political aims of the ruling circles of the US and Britain permeated not only the planning of military operations but also the whole course of military actions. Politics influenced not only the goals of operations, but also the methods and forms of carrying out military operations as a whole.

The political aims of the US and Britain excluded a determined waging of the war against Germany, since they were not interested in shortening the period of bringing World War II to an end. This explains the passive, waiting-out nature of the Anglo-American strategy during the war.

Turning his attention to his main purpose -- revealing "the real reasons why the governments of the US and Great Britain delayed till June 1944 the invasion of Europe -- the author has arrived at the following important conclusions:

-- The political and military leadership of the US and Britain was to blame for frustrating the invasion of the European continent in 1942-1943, despite the real possibilities that existed for accomplishing it. Thereby the ruling circles of the western countries, in essence, helped Germany wage war against the USSR.

-- The US and British governments regarded a second front only as the final blow in finishing up the war in Europe, leaving the Soviet burden to bear the main burden of the war.

-- Our former allies not only did not want to shorten the war, but even strove to drag it out for the sake of mutual exhaustion of both Germany and the Soviet Union. This is what determined the character of Anglo-American strategic planning during World War II.

-- The opening of the second front in western Europe took place in 1944, because by then to postpone it was not without danger to the interests of the ruling circles of the US and Britain, since the Red Army might, with its own forces, accomplish the defeat of Fascist Germany and liberate the peoples of Europe from Fascist slavery.

Kulish's book, as a whole, deserves commendation. It has expanded the arsenal of facts of Soviet historiography on the opening of the second front in Europe, and serves the cause of struggle against hostile bourgeois ideology and falsification of history. However, it would be incorrect to say that it has completely exhausted the subject. The interests of the science of military history and exposing bourgeois falsification of the history of the past war requires further study of the politics and strategy of the US and Britain on the matter of a second front in Europe in 1941-1943

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study approved in 1964. Such problems as the influence of politics on the character of military operations in the Mediterranean basin, the military-economic capabilities of the US and Britain in 1941-1943, and in connection with this, more complete evidence of the possibilities of opening a second front in Europe in that period -- especially in 1941-- still await further research, utilizing new sources, and foreign publications. Unfortunately, most of the books of foreign authors used by Kulish were published before 1960 (of 150 named, only eight were published in the period 1960-1964).

Offensive missions on the ideological front require that Soviet historians retain the initiative, including in the field of deep study of World War II, especially of the subject of opening a second front in Europe in 1941-1943.

Notes:

gg. 1. V.M. Kulish. Vtoroy front. Operatsii v Zapadnoy Yevrope v 1944-1945, (The Second Front; Operations in Western Europe in 1944-1945), Voenizdat, 1960 476 pp.; D. Kraminov. Pravda o vtorom fronte. Zapiski voyennogo korrespondenta (The Truth About the Second Front; Notes of a War Correspondent), Karel'skoye gosudarstvennoye izdatel'stvo, 1960, 232 pp.

2. Vtoraya mirovaya voyna 1939-1945 gg. Voenno-istoricheskiy ocherk (World War II; A Military-Historical Outline), Voenizdat, 1958, pp. 643-660, 712-716; G.A. Deborin. Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Voenno-politicheskiy ocherk (World War II; A Military-Political Outline), Voenizdat, 1958, pp. 195-204, 285-290; V.G. Trukhanovskiy. Noveyshaya istoriya Anglii (Most Recent History of England), Sotsekgiz, 1958, pp. 399-406, 409-410; Ye. I. Rybkin, Voyna i Politika (War and Politics), Voenizdat, 1959, pp. 102-105; V.L. Israelyan, Diplomaticheskaya istoriya velikoy otechestvennoy voyny (Diplomatic History of the Great Patriotic War), Izdatel'stvo instituta mezhdonarodnykh otnosheniy, 1959, pp. 70-80, 129-215; Ocherki novoy i noveyshey istorii SSHA (Outlines of Modern and Most Recent History of the United States), Vol. II, Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1960, pp. 285-297, 302-312; Porazheniye germanskogo imperializma vo vtoroy mirovoy voyna. Stat'i i dokumenty. (The Defeat of German Imperialism in World War II. Articles and Documents), Voenizdat, 1960, pp. 163-177; N.N. Yakovlev, Noveyshaya istoriya SSHA (Most Recent History of the USA), Sotsekgiz, 1961, pp. 356-394; Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945), Voenizdat, Vol. II, 1963, pp. 177-190; Vol. III, 1964, pp. 491-509; Vol. IV, 1962 [sic], pp. 507-544; Uroki istorii neoproverzhiy (The Lessons of History are Irrefutable) Voenizdat, 1964, pp. 147-172; and other works.

Yevrope (A Secret Revealed: History of the Period Preceding the Second Front in Europe), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1965, 470 pp.

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4. Referring to the archives of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the author calls attention to some inaccurate data on this subject in the second volume of Istoriya velikoy otechestvennoy vovny 1941-1945 (History of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945) and in the work of Yu. I. Vol'skiy published in the collection, Voprosy novoy i noveyshey istorii (Problems of Modern and Most Recent History), Izdatel'stvo Akademii Obshchestvennykh Nauk, 1958, pp. 77, 82. The Military-History Division of the Military-Science Administration of the General Staff, analyzing the same documents of the archives of the Ministry of Defense, came to the conclusion that in the Western Theater of Military Operations in June 1941 there were 39 German divisions and 2 tank brigades, and in North Africa, 2 German tank divisions. Sbornik materialov po sostavu, gruppirovke i peregruppirovke sukhoputnykh voysk fashistskoy Germanii i fashistskoy Italii vne sovetskogermanskogo fronta za period 1941-1945 gg. (Collection of Materials on the Composition, Disposition, and Redisposition of the Ground Forces of Fascist Germany and Fascist Italy, Other than on the Soviet-German Front, During the Period 1941-1945), first edition, 1963, pp. 8-12.

6. [5 missing] Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna Sovetskaya Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya. (The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945) a Brief History), Voenizdat, 1965, P. 149.

7. John Snell, Illusion and Necessity, p. 103.

8. Ibid., p. 111.

9. E. Maguir, Dieppe: August 19, London, 1963, p. 187

10. John Snell, Illusion and Necessity, p. 112

11. Ibid.

12. McElwee. The Battle of D-Day. London, 1965, p. 24.

13. I. Zemskov, "Diplomaticheskaya istoriya vtorogo fronta" (Diplomatic History of the Second Front), "Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn", 1961, No. 8.

14. American Military History, 1607-1958, Washington, 1959, p. 382

15. A. Buchanan, The United States and World War II, vol. 1. New York, 1964, p. 144.

16. G. Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945, New York, 1965, p. 22.

17. B. Smith, Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions in Europe, 1944-1945, New York, 1956